CANADIAN URBAN INSTITUTE

Planning the Toronto Region: Lessons From Other Places

Proceedings

Urban Focus Series 90-9

92-05686/

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ISSN: 1183-2304 ISBN: 1-895446-16-3

90-9 Lessons From Other Places: Planning the Toronto Region

The proceedings of a symposium organized by the Canadian Urban Institute for the Office of the Greater Toronto Area, Government of Ontario.

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Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main Entry under title:
Planning the Toronto Region: Lessons from Other Places

(Urban Focus Series ; 90-9)
Proceedings of a symposium organized by the Canadian Urban Institute for the Office of the Greater Toronto Area and held October 31-November 1, 1990.
ISBN 1-895446-16-3

1. City Planning - Ontario - Toronto Metropolitan Area. Congresses. 2. City Planning - Congresses. 3. Urban Policy - Ontario. - Toronto Metropolitan Area - Congresses. 4. Urban Policy - Congresses. I. Canadian Urban Institute. II. Title: Lessons from Other Places. III. Series.

HT169.C32T67 1991 307.1'216'09713541 091-093638

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INTRODUCTION

These are the proceedings of a symposium organized by the Canadian Urban Institute, under the title *Planning the Toronto Region: Lessons From Other Places*. The symposium brought to Toronto academics, researchers, and policy makers from Chicago, Dortmund, Melbourne, Paris, the Randstad, and San Francisco who described the challenges faced by their urban regions. Peter Hall delivered a keynote address that set an international context for dealing with the challenges of regional planning and management in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA).

The GTA was not alone in its experience of rapid growth in the 1980s. Most of the world's major urban regions in the 1990s find themselves facing problems of both growth and decline. Technical and organizational changes have resulted in massive losses of manufacturing and goods-handling firms from inner-city areas, releasing large tracts of land for redevelopment. At the same time, decentralization of population and employment has created new pressures for development at the fringe, sometimes far distant from the metropolitan core. In many regions the latter process is spawning a polycentric urban from with multiple governments and authorities, often with overlapping and competing responsibilities.

The aim of the symposium was to allow decision-makers in the GTA to understand how growth and decline are being handled in other urban regions. Participants learned about the effects of different kinds of intervention—and about the consequences of inaction. The focus of the symposium was on successful as well as unsuccessful responses to regional urban growth that has been experienced in these urban regions.

At the last minute, the speaker from Sweden withdrew, to be replaced by a speaker from the Netherlands. Data about Stockholm are nevertheless included in the table of comparative information at the end of this volume.

SYMPOSIUM PROGRAM

Wednesday, October 31, 1990

8:30-10:30 p.m. **Managing Growth in the World's Cities**
Introduction by Richard Gilbert, President, Canadian Urban Institute
Speaker: Peter Hall

Thursday, November 1, 1990

8:45-9:45 a.m. **Concurrent Sessions**

Chicago
Moderator: Chairman Frank Bean, Regional Municipality of Peel
Speaker: Elizabeth Hollander

San Francisco
Moderator: Chairman Peter Pomeroy, Regional Municipality of Halton
Speaker: Raymond Brady

10:00-11:00 a.m. **Concurrent Sessions**

Paris
Moderator: Mayor Joyce Trimmer, City of Scarborough
Speaker: Gilles Antier

The Randstad
Moderator: Chairman Eldred King, Regional Municipality of York
Speaker: Gerard Keijzers

11:15-12:15 a.m. **Concurrent Sessions**

Melbourne
Moderator: Mayor Wayne Arthurs, Town of Pickering
Speaker: Brian McLoughlin

German Urban Regions
Moderator: Mayor Lorna Jackson, Town of Vaughan
Speaker: Klaus Kunzmann

2:00-3:30 p.m.	*Plenary Session*: **Transportation and Density** Dr. Juri Pill, General Manager, Administration and Planning, Toronto Transit Commission Ron Soskolne, Senior Vice President, Planning and Development, Olympia and York. *Panelists*: Elizabeth Hollander, Gilles Antier, Gerard Keijzers
3:45-5:15 p.m.	*Plenary Session*: **Strategies and Tools** Neal Irwin, Managing Director, IBI Group Joe Berridge, Berridge Lewinberg Greenberg. *Panelists*: Raymond Brady, Brian McLoughlin, Klaus Kunzmann, Peter Hall.
5:15-5:30 p.m.	Closing Remarks by Richard Gilbert, President, Canadian Urban Institute

1

MANAGING GROWTH IN THE WORLD'S CITIES

Peter Hall

Managing growth has become a major concern, even an obsession, in the world's great cities during the 1980s. The reasons are evident to everyone at this conference. One of the longest and strongest upswings in the history of the capitalist system has brought huge pressures for commercial development and redevelopment. Though in most advanced countries and cities the natural rates of population growth have reached an historic low, continued immigration into most cities has brought large numbers of relatively young people from less developed countries with higher birth rates. People have been voting in the market for more space in and around their homes. New jobs have been created and these too have demanded more space per worker. All these demands have come together in the market in the form of seemingly inexorable pressure for more development.

Some of these pressures have come in and around the urban cores, in the form of mega-developments to house the increasing numbers of jobs in the new informational economy. That has particularly been the case when—as here in Toronto, as also in London and San Francisco and a score of other cities—the growth of this economy has gone side by side with the contraction and out-movement of the older manufacturing and goods-handling service activities, thus releasing large tracts of dockland or railroad freight areas in prime sites close to the central business district. But inevitably, only a small part of the total demand could be met in this way. The outward movement of people to the suburbs has been accompanied by an outward movement of jobs.

In consequence, every one of these cities has become more polycentric over the past twenty years. The traditional downtown is now only the leading commercial center among a number of others, some of which may compete strongly with it. Thus the traditional pattern of movement—radially, inward during the morning peak, outward during the late afternoon—has increasingly been overlain by other movements, both reverse commuting and criss-cross commuting. My Berkeley colleague Bob Cervero likens this last pattern to a box of matches thrown almost randomly on to a table.

Almost everyone here can declaim the same litany of resulting woes. While pressures continue for development at the fringe, consuming top class farmland or precious potential recreational areas, older inner city areas may languish and decay. Consequently there are increasingly insistent cries for help from inner urban electorates and from the politicians who represent them. The commuting system is forced to readapt itself to carrying more and more long distance commuters, who may use

different commuting modes: Network South East instead of the London Underground, the RER instead of the Métro, the S-Bahn rather than the U-Bahn, BART or Caltrain rather than the Muni, GO train rather than the subway. And there are continued pressures on these longer-distance networks to extend themselves farther and farther out. At the extreme, as in London and Tokyo, commuters may increasingly be willing to commute up to 160 kilometers, each way each day, on high-speed trains. For the non-traditional commuters, the problem is even less tractable: their criss-cross journeys do not answer to any known pattern of transit service, yet by taking to their automobiles they finally congest a highway system that was never designed for these loads, leading to the situation so aptly described by Bob Cervero as suburban gridlock. Local communities in the middle of the growth wave perceive all costs and no benefits, and become fervent supporters of anti-growth movements designed to stop development in its tracks. The result all too quickly becomes a kind of mass beggar-thy-neighbor policy, in which each locality attempts to pass on growth and its burdens to the next place down the line. And, if communities react by trying to tax development, the result will almost certainly be to shrink the supply of affordable housing for newcomers and old-time residents alike.

The Problem of Job Mismatch

One first problem, which has expressed itself especially in American and British cities but has also been observed in Germany, is a growing spatial mismatch between the supply of labor and the demand for it. To simplify massively, the new jobs are being created in the suburbs while a labor surplus is left in the inner cities. That is too simple, because jobs are being created in the downtown cores also; the problem is that they are filled by in-commuters from the suburbs, while local workers remain unemployed. This phenomenon, which has been intensively studied in the United States as part of the academic debate on the so-called urban underclass, seems to have one clear origin: the educational demands of employers are rising far faster than the standards of inner city school leavers. Here there is one misapprehension: contrary to popular belief, the qualifications of American school leavers, especially black school leavers, are rising; the problem is simply that the expectations of employers are rising more rapidly. An answer to this problem has to lie in further improving the performance of urban school systems, coupled with special programs to try to attract local workers into new jobs. The London Docklands Development Corporation is pursuing such a policy with the new jobs created in the Isle of Dogs Enterprise Zone, and reports some success.

The spatial mismatch expresses itself in the fact that many of the middle-level jobs are being created in the suburbs, necessitating long and often difficult commutes from the inner city, especially for those lacking access to a car. That at any rate is the theory; the actuality may be more complex. In metro areas where suburban jobs are clustered around transit interchanges, for instance, it may not be true at all. This logically brings us to the question of transportation and land use.

As homes and jobs leapfrog over each other, there are two almost inevitable immediate results: the average commute becomes longer, and the pattern of commuting becomes more and more chaotic, no longer confined by traditional transportation corridors. Further, as just seen, the employment center of gravity moves ever further from the residences of underskilled, disadvantaged inner city workers. The inevitable result is gridlock on the suburban highways and overcrowding on whatever longer-distance commuter trains may exist.

Down to about 1970, the most advanced metro areas sought to control this process by using land use planning to build up pyramids of density, both for job opportunities and for residences, around transit interchanges. Stockholm pioneered that approach in its Markelius plan in the late 1940s, structuring its new suburban satellites around the *Tunnelbana* stations; Toronto followed not long after, and Paris has applied the principle on the grand scale by building the five *villes nouvelles* around the RER stations. These are outstanding textbook examples of good land use planning. But there are two potential problems with them.

The first is that people tend to demand more space than their parents. Even if they have fewer children (and some have more), they almost certainly have many more possessions like hi-fis and boats and workshop equipment, which are bulky. They are also apt to own not one, but several cars per household. In the Stockholm of the 1950s, coming out of cramped old city apartments and still aspiring to own their first Volvos, people were happy to move into a two-bedroom apartment in a tower block close to a stop on the new *Tunnelbana*. But their children in the 1990s are settling into American-style single-family homes 40 or 50 kilometers from downtown Stockholm, well outside the reach of the *Tunnelbana* and almost certainly out of walking distance to the SJ commuter trains too; you can see them gridlocked on the E4 and the E18 every morning and night.

In the San Francisco Bay Area, the architect Peter Calthorpe has devised what he claims is an answer to this dilemma, in the form of a new kind of housing: he calls it the Pedestrian Pocket (Calthorpe and Mack 1988, Kelbaugh et al., 1989). It consists of single-family houses with their own private garden space, developed in rows along pedestrian scale streets; cars are banished to the periphery of the development, while a transit routes runs down the spine. This means that just as in Stockholm in the 1950s, it is actually more convenient to take public transportation than to use the car; the difference is that in other respects, the Calthorpe design offers Californians the kind of housing they are used to and have come to expect.

The pedestrian pocket is a very exciting and innovative concept. It is not just a concept: Calthorpe has developed such a scheme in the City of San Jose, and it has sold well in the open market. He is now designing a much more ambitious scheme for the

Californian capital of Sacramento, a metro area of some 1.5 million people which has been experiencing acute growing pains. The problem though is that the solution, like all such solutions, depends fundamentally on radial hub-and-spoke patterns of transportation: in San Jose and Sacramento, as in Stockholm and Toronto and Paris, though in all three cases short-distance bus lines interconnect into the stations, they cannot provide adequately for the almost random pattern of cross-trips that tends to develop in the post-1960 metropolis. Further, as the Toronto and Stockholm examples show, suburban development soon extends outside the feasible radius of a conventional, frequent-stop subway system; and the same will soon be true of the two Californian cases, where the transportation spine is a light rail system.

To grapple with this problem, starting in the 1960s, metro areas have created new commuter networks on the model of the San Francisco BART, the Parisian RER or the Frankfurt S-Bahn: express systems which link the downtown areas directly with distant suburbs and satellite towns. Especially in Paris, this strategy was linked with the creation of strong sub-centers in the satellites, thus distributing and reconcentrating employment, and creating balancing sets of commuter flows. Such commuter networks may extend 70 or 80 kilometers from the urban cores, thus serving the great majority of all demands for radial transportation (though, as already noted, in both London and Tokyo, a small minority of commuters are now beginning to use high-speed trains to commute up to 160 kilometers each way each day). The main problem with this approach was still that it could not cater adequately for the cross-flows, which were left on an overloaded highway system designed for the quite different purpose of carrying inter-city or by-pass traffic. Frankfurt offers a dramatic example here.

Very belatedly, some cities have begun to think of adapting their systems to give a more even pattern of grid-type access between any subcenter and any other. This was explicit in the original, never-realised plan for the San Francisco BART; the Frankfurt S-Bahn, which is a net connecting the cities of Frankfurt, Mainz, Wiesbaden and Darmstadt, has some of the same characteristics; Paris is now said to be pondering an outer circular RER connecting the satellites and other destinations like the airports. The problem is that, mapped on to metros of this size, it still leaves a very large number of traffic desires inadequately catered for. Indeed, the nearest approach to meeting such demands is represented by smaller cities like Ottawa and Houston, which have recast their bus systems in the hub and spoke system, interconnecting reliably through a number of suburban exchanges. The planned express busway—non-guided in this case—through the southern suburbs of Paris, which would link with the RER system and with local buses at selected interchanges, provides another model.

These examples suggest a possible prototype for a future metropolitan transportation system which would give many-to-many accessibility partly over ordinary streets, partly over an automated guideway system. It would be based on small van-like vehicles rather like the shuttle buses which are now coming into such widespread use between airports and hotels. They would be either electrically-powered—a real possibility, given the huge push to the development of electrical

vehicles which has come from the recent California air quality regulations—or perhaps dual mode, capable of switching between gasoline and electricity. At nodal points they would be coupled together, either physically or electronically, to run as automated trains along special guideways. At yet other nodes they would split again to serve local destinations. Of course, no metropolitan area in the world currently offers anything of the kind. But elements of the system exist: in the guided busways in use in Adelaide and Essen, in the dual-mode vehicles already in service in Essen and Nancy, and in automated transit systems in Lille, Vancouver, London Docklands, Osaka and Kobe.

There is an alternative—perhaps only a partial alternative—which is to try to cater for these flows by Transportation Systems Management techniques designed to divert demand from the conventional, single-driver no-passenger automobile into more collective or shared modes such as vans and car pools. This is achieved by a variety of carrots and sticks ranging from access to preferential high occupancy vehicle lanes and parking slots, through direct cash incentives, to physical limitation and charging for access to employment nodes. At least one suburban downtown area in the United States, Bellevue in the state of Washington, has done that with considerable success. Road pricing, such as has been in force in central Oslo since early this year and is promised for central Stockholm at the start of next years, could be employed in the same way not only in congested downtown areas, but also in the suburban nodes.

The reason why this is only a partial alternative, of course, is that it could evolve into the first system. There is already a blurring of traditional distinctions between one mode of transportation and another: the difference between a rubber-tired Metro and a guided trolleybus is an extremely subtle one, as is the distinction between a small van and a taxi. And, as more and more information technology is injected into the traditional highway system, it increasingly takes on the characteristics of a transit operation. So, within the next decade, we could look forward to a convergence of the different modes, wherein cars were electronically locked together on transitways while transit systems increasingly offered on-demand service from any place to any other place.

By building up pyramids and corridors of density linked by such novel kinds of transit or para-transit, planners could reduce the total burden of commuting. And, as sub-centers built up and became increasingly attractive magnets in their own right, the average commute length might drop. This seems to be the experience in London, where research shows that within ten years, half or more of the out-migrants are absorbed by the local labor market and so cease to be long-distance commuters. Californian evidence suggests that so far this is not happening: there, the average commute is increasing. But this may be due to the fact that the development of subcenters is lagging behind the outward movement of people—a result, perhaps, of the strength of the growth control pressures in the intervening tracts.

But there is more than just a transportation problem: increasingly, the suburbs do not want new suburbanites and the exurbs do not want anyone else at all. So we find everywhere the problem of local NIMBYism, whereby local communities draw up the drawbridge and bring down the portcullis against further development. Their arguments against growth are numerous, and unite people of different income, socio-economic status and political persuasion. One, a very telling one, is that the tidal wave of growth drives up local housing prices for local resident and newcomer alike. Thus affordable housing becomes an increasing rarity. In the San Francisco Bay Area, house prices jumped 31.8% between early 1988 and early 1989 to reach an average $243,900, setting an unfortunate national record (Tuller 1989, A10). Only 17% of all households in the region, it has been calculated, earn enough to qualify for a loan on a typical single-family home, even if they could stump up a down payment of some $45,000 (Bay Area Council 1988, 8). According to a 1988 study, some 492,000 households in the region may already have been paying more than 25% of their incomes for housing (Bay Area Council 1989a, 3).

More generally, growth brings negative externalities in the form of traffic congestion, crowded school systems, loss of local open space and perhaps higher taxes—a very telling point in a time of constraints on public expenditure. Residents may perceive that they are paying more but are enjoying less and less quality of life. So long as they form local constituencies, they will organize to fight further growth. This movement, evident in southern England at least since the 1950s, has now spread to areas long thought immune—such as California, long the home of civic boosterism and growth mindedness.

And interestingly, the residents tend to prove equally effective in their negative objectives, almost independently of the precise legalities of the planning and zoning system under which they operate. Twenty years ago, before Petaluma, few people in California would really have believed that they had powers to stop growth in its tracks, British style; now, every community in the San Francisco Bay Area is going now that road, and the hapless developers are increasingly glad of what crumbs they can get from the local planners' table.

The problem with this approach is that it too equally leads to a beggar-thy-neighbor competition in which the only objective is to keep them, meaning the others, out. Greenbelts are used not to protect attractive landscapes or unique agricultural land, but simply as a means of urban containment; an unfortunate tradition begun in Britain in the mid-1950s, and now being emulated all too widely. But since the pressures are there, they cannot really be stemmed: all that happens is that they are diverted onward, to the first line of places either politically weak enough or economically depressed enough to offer no resistance. Currently, in the case of London that means East Anglia,

and in the case of San Francisco it means somewhere in the San Joaquin Valley; in both cases, 80 kilometers and more from the metropolitan core.

There are two approaches to this problem, which may be seen as alternatives but which are not necessarily so. The first is to find a way of passing the costs of development from the community to the developer. The other is to develop a regional planning agency to minimize and at least share equably the miseries that rise from development.

Extracting development value comes in two different forms. The simplest is the so-called impact fee, payable by the developer to mitigate the alleged negative impacts that the development is going to inflict on the community. At the beginning of 1989, the National Association of Home Builders and the American Planning Association reported that so-called impact fees were being levied in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah and Washington. They derive indirectly from a brilliant notion of Marion Clawson, published nearly a quarter of a century ago: to auction development permissions to the highest bidder (Clawson 1967). But they are not quite so elegantly audacious. Instead, local communities persuade developers to pay a huge package of fixed fees in order to mitigate growth pressures—real or imagined—on roads, sewers, fire service, parks and swimming pools. In California, fees even cover child care facilities. The relationship between development and creches, you may think, is not crystal clear.

The point is that developers, who in California are a fairly desperate breed, pay anyway. Local authorities in high-growth areas—meaning all the counties around California's major urban areas in the 1980s—have charged more or less what they pleased. In the seller's market that prevailed in much of the 1980s, the costs were passed promptly on to the hapless home buyer—which meant a hike in average new housing costs varying, according to location, from anything between $3000 and $24,000. The cost, of course, goes straight on to the price of the house. Thus impact fees become a tax imposed by existing residents on new arrivals.

The developers have cried foul. So in 1987, the California Assembly passed a bill to regulate impact fees; it took effect in January 1989. It states that a local government must establish a 'nexus' between the fee and the development that is supposed to pay for it. The revenue must be put into a trust fund, with a plan for spending it; the money must be spent, or at least committed, within five years. But, according to reports last year, the big cities are actually extending the principle from new housing to new industrial and commercial developments. The developers are reacting by going to court, claiming that the 'nexus' is not established.

A different approach is emerging in New England. As you must all be aware, states in New England are very small, rather like California counties; and the local authorities, called townships, are often minuscule. In New Hampshire, one such state that is growing rapidly through suburban spread from Boston, state legislators have

sought to pass a law that would standardize the fees throughout the state: local authorities would no longer be free to set their own levels. Ironically, home builders and realtors have opposed the legislation, claiming that a standard fee would drive up housing costs. Advocates of the bill argue that the fees are going to be charged anyway, so standardization would be better.

The second approach, development or planning agreements, seems to have arisen spontaneously and independently in Great Britain and California. Britain's 1971 Town and Country Planning Act established the principle in the form of Section 52 agreements: they have been used more and more widely in the boom years of the 1980s. California's law on Development Agreements dates from 1980, nearly a decade after the British legislation, which it closely resembles (Smith 1988). It was little used at first, but during the 1980s local authorities—faced with unprecedented growth pressures and strapped for cash because of 1978's Proposition 13—have employed the device on an increasing scale. At the last count, there were more than 500 such agreements in California. They cover a very wide variety of developments, from fairly modest housing developments to the 300-acre Mission Bay redevelopment in San Francisco. One Californian expert, William Fulton, calls them 'the institutionalization of development fees'. Interestingly, Fulton concludes, they manage to extract even more out of the developer than the traditional impact fee (Fulton 1989).

But the local communities, where NIMBY feeling runs high, are still not satisfied. Reports keep surfacing in local newspapers that local officials and professionals are using agreements to circumvent local anti-growth pressures. Local voters have reacted by using California's referendum laws to pass so-called propositions, compelling their councils to control or stop growth. Several important such measures have passed recently, in both southern and Northern California. The point is that once approved by a Development Agreement, a development is secure from any subsequent anti-growth ballot.

But not quite. The Development Agreements are likely to face legal challenges. The lawyers, as usual, will find plenty of work. But, given the fact that—in California as in southern England—an irresistible force is meeting an immovable object, the agreements seem likely to stay as the least-bad compromise. But they are unlikely to be sufficient, as British examples like Foxley Wood show. Foxley Wood in Hampshire, 70 kilometers south-west of London, was to be an exceptionally well-designed new community developed by private capital. On regional planning grounds it was unexceptionable. Development agreements would have provided all kinds of good things for the local community, ranging from a by-pass to affordable housing. But implacable local opposition, coupled with the arrival of a new environmentally-minded incumbent at the Department of the Environment, settled its fate.

There is one interesting point about the agreements. By definition, they must be used to provide concrete measures in mitigation of the effects of growth. They can be, and are, used to provide affordable housing, for instance. That is equally true in the

California agreements and in the incentives which developers have built into proposed new communities in southern England. This aspect is important because of the argument that the agreements themselves will inevitably drive up general house prices. The implication is that the newcomer can pay the inflated price while the existing resident enjoys some kind of cross-subsidy. Reducing the cost of housing to some deserving sub-group of the population is of course a well-known policy device: it has been employed in public housing everywhere, and in the Thatcher government's sale of public housing to the sitting tenants. It has been less used in the case of new housing for sale. The problem with all such schemes is the difficulty of controlling them beyond the first regulated sale. Just like the ex-council tenant, the owner of affordable housing can simply profit from a windfall gain. There are two ways of dealing with this: either to turn a blind eye on the basis that the resident benefits anyway, or to insist on the return of the housing into some special pool, whereby any profits accrue in part to the community to be used for further affordable housing.

Towards Regional Agencies

In turn, these tensions lead to a demand for more effective regional planning agencies, which would try to balance these local antagonisms and devise some plan for sharing the misery. Metro Toronto set a model for the rest of the world over a quarter of a century ago. It was followed by Stockholm's Lä n (provincial) government, with planning powers over a wide area around the city. The Région Ile-de-France, originally an administrative device but now democratically elected, falls into the same category.

Such an agency can, and must, be responsible for an overall strategic plan for the entire region, regularly updated. It must clearly indicate the areas which have major development or redevelopment, and those areas which in contrast are to be protected against development. Both on good planning grounds, and also to win political acceptance, the plan should make quite clear that most land will be protected for the foreseeable future. There is no point, here, in discussing details of the form of that green space; it will depend on circumstance. Some half a century ago, Unwin and Abercrombie in London wrote about towns against a background of open country. In San Francisco they now talk about a regional greenbelt, by which they mean not the old Abercrombie Green Belt for London, but the much more general backcloth that he imagined extending outside that belt. In the new *Livre Blanc* for the Région Ile-de-France, they refer to a *Trame Verte* and a *couronne rurale*, which are terms so general as to be about right (Anon 1990). The point is that such a regional backcloth should be pervasive. Its precise form will depend on a multitude of factors: the pattern of existing settlements, the existing and planned transportation links, the quality of agricultural land and the intensity of agricultural production, and the existence of fine natural landscapes.

How to guarantee its preservation? Historically, cities have used various methods, more or less successfully. Stockholm and Amsterdam bought land in advance,

allowing the Dutch to preserve the *Amsterdamse Bos* and the Swedes to ring each of their satellites with generous forest and lake belts. Frankfurt, similarly, preserved its own *Stadtwald*. The British, in their 1947 Act, nationalized the right to develop land. The Americans at first preferred to buy land for regional parks—an outstandingly successful policy in the San Francisco Bay Area, where it has produced one of the finest scenic green belts in the world. Latterly, indeed very belatedly, they have discovered that their general police powers allow them to reserve wide tracts in rural zoning without the need to pay any compensation to owners. That power has so far been upheld in the courts, and has produced huge extensions of the San Francisco regional green belt in the northern and western parts of Marin County, for instance. The interesting fact about the American and especially the Californian experience, I believe, is that it demonstrates how changing public opinion can progressively mold the development of policy and indeed the legal framework itself. The reason that the Bay Area is protecting land is that there is a deep groundswell of grassroots opinion in favor of growth management. Developers read the signs, and are willing to bend to the new reality, as we have already seen with developer agreements.

The problem is not with the powers, but with the size of the agency. The now-deceased Greater London Council covered only 1600 square kilometers; the Région Ile-de-France, in contrast, covers 12,000 square kilometers. There is little doubt that the latter region is adequate for the strategic planning functions it has to perform. A similar region for London would need to embrace not only the entire South East of England, but a goodly chunk of the adjoining regions of East Anglia, the East Midlands and the South West. In the case of San Francisco, as the debates within the Bay Vision 2020 commission now demonstrate, it would realistically need to embrace not only the nine-county Bay Area but also at least the next neighboring ring, perhaps six or even nine more; in the case of Frankfurt, it would need to go right outside the area of the *Umlandverband* to embrace much of *Regierungsbezirk Darmstadt* and a substantial chunk of the neighboring *Land* of Rheinland-Pfalz.

The question becomes: where does such a region stop? For in our large metro areas, we are now starting to see a pattern of complex urbanization, whereby one metro interacts with another, and that in turn with another, so that there is no discrete boundary to the spheres of influence at all. This is more evident a problem in those metropolitan centers which exist in densely populated territory occupied by other urban spheres. Thus Paris has no real urban challenger within a 100-mile radius, but London's sphere interacts with Reading's, and its with Swindon's, and its with Bristol's. And the same is starting to happen as between San Francisco and Sacramento and Stockton, which a decade ago could be regarded as reasonably discrete metro areas. On the mainland of Europe, the French urban analysts are now talking of the Blue Banana: a megalopolitan zone that extends down the middle of Europe from London to Milan, every area interacting with the next (Brunet 1990). What kind of regional planning agency, one wonders, would bring that under some kind of control?

For the fact is that the real action, the locus of maximum growth of people and jobs, is now way beyond the scope of a conventional regional agency. And such an agency, in consequence, may find itself administering and planning that part of the wider metro which is stagnating—the situation that the GLC found itself occupying for virtually the whole of its 25-year life. The almost inevitable result would be that such a body would become obsessively concerned with consolidating its own population—in which it would make common cause with the beleaguered anti-growth communities in its own suburbs and outside its boundaries. This has been the experience in London during the 1980s, where the GLC and then the London boroughs were very happy to accept the central government's target that no less than one-third of all the houses in the South East region should be provided within London's boundaries. The result has been a very great deal of very substandard housing, which people bought in desperation during the boom years of the mid-1980s but which is now virtually unsellable. And I very much fear that the same outcome could be true of a regional planning agency for the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area, which is the predicted recommendation of the blue-ribbon Bay Vision 2020 study expected late this year.

There is another aspect to this problem, which is purely political. It is the relationship between such a regional authority and the next higher level of power. As everyone knows, the main reason for the demise of the GLC was that it came to be seen as an alternative government, defiantly facing down Mrs Thatcher across the water from the Houses of Parliament. Similar conflicts with the Autonomous Region of Catalonia are said to have sealed the fate of the Metro government of Barcelona. The same problem is potentially acute both in Ontario and in the State of Victoria, where a metropolitan authority is bound to represent a large part of the population and an even larger chunk of the total provincial product. And it may very well prove difficult to manage the relationships between the Federal Republic and the new *Land* government of Berlin—even though, there, the future suburbs are all within *Land* Brandenburg. It is perhaps for this reason, above all, that Australian states have flirted only for short periods with the metro government idea, though South Australia may well take the plunge again in the next couple of years.

So there are undoubtedly basic problems with the whole concept of effective regional government. That is not to say that the idea is not worth even contemplating. Toronto has made it work. So have a number of areas on the European mainland, including Frankfurt and Copenhagen. One lesson from those places is that it pays to keep the structure very slim and very simple. There are two possible prescriptions.

The Slimline Elected Model.

Most of these European examples are ad hoc creations that have no clear constitutional status, but were set up to deal with special cases; they are fragile because they depend on agreement. They can be very slim—Greater Copenhagen has only 115 employees, the Frankfurt Regional Union 187—and some of them, at least, have shown a capacity to survive for quite a long time. Greater Copenhagen's council is indirectly elected through

the boroughs, and this might offer a good model for other areas, perhaps with an admixture of members representing the wider interest: either Mps, or persons nominated by the Secretary of State. In *London 2001* I suggested such a structure for London, covering an area considerably wider than the old GLC, perhaps extending over the entire Metropolitan Area, perhaps even farther (Hall 1989). It would presumably take over all the functions of the current London regional Standing Conference, SERPLAN. Its remit would be to produce statements of regional guidance which, after approval by the Secretary of State, would be binding on borough and district authorities in drawing up their own unitary plans. It would also have a specific remit to advise on investment plans for both main roads and public transport in its area.

There are however three basic doubts about such a body. This is whether the necessary modicum of agreement would be forthcoming among its members. Experience of SERPLAN, ever since the first version was set up as long ago as the 1930s, is that it is a good research organization and talking shop but a weak decision-making body, tending to express the lowest common multiple of agreement among its members—particularly since one of its main remits, if not *the* main remit, would be to decide where to place growth that no one wanted. The second, closely-associated, worry is whether it would have any teeth. Strategic planning is fine so long as it gets implemented in real decisions on the ground; otherwise, it is a pure waste of time and money. The GLC's history is salutary here: because it essentially lacked the implementation powers, it became a purely paper authority. A slimmed-down authority, restricted by statute, could find itself powerless.

The third possible objection is that an indirectly elected body, especially if diluted by nominees, is not a democratically responsible body. To that the answer is that it would be very difficult to ensure direct democratic answerability over such a vast geographical area, and on such general strategic issues; direct elections would hardly be likely to generate much excitement, save on rare occasions when some media-worthy issue cropped up.

The Government-Appointed Model.

If however a streamline Copenhagen-style authority is excluded from consideration on the ground that it is too threatening to the central or provincial government, the only alternative seems to be central control by the next superior level of government: the provincial authority in a federal system like Canada or Australia or Germany, the central government in a country like Britain or France. Distasteful as it may seem to many people, it may be the only practicable option. In *London 2001* I suggested that under such a centralist prescription, there should be an advisory Metropolitan Planning and Transportation Commission for London, covering a wide area around Greater London, perhaps the whole South East. It would be appointed by the Secretary of State for the Environment, and would have a remit to advise him future on main lines of development within the region. It would be charged with producing a regional framework for development and redevelopment, and channelling public investment in

inner city regeneration. It would identify the areas for major development and redevelopment within the region, including sites for new communities. It would also need to be centrally involved in coordinating regional investment in transportation and communications, whether by road, rail or telecommunications. It would be the equivalent of an Urban Development Corporation on the scale of a whole region, but it would not itself plan in detail; its job would end once action areas were designated and the development rights sold.

Objections might well be raised to an authority with such draconian powers of direct development. In that case it might be possible to think of a weaker but still effective model. American regulatory agencies, and the similar organizations recently set up in Britain to oversee the privatized telecommunications and water industries, have no executive powers; yet they have proved surprisingly effective as watchdogs of the general public interest, even on matters of detail. So it might be possible to adopt that model, whereby the agency did not develop itself, but gave binding directives to the local authorities to do so. Something like this weaker model seems to be a likely outcome in California, where Assembly Speaker Willie Brown has proposed establishment of nine regional development authorities covering the entire state, and administered directly by the State government. This bill has lapsed during the current gubernatorial election, but may well resurface in some form after the campaign is over. My problem with this alternative, which may prove to be your problem also, is that dealing with a elected authority, backed by an angry local electorate, is an entirely different business from dealing with an insecure private monopoly like British Telecom or Thames Water.

Summing Up

If there is one message I would like to leave behind tonight, it is that there are no quick fixes. No great metropolitan area in the world has got it entirely right, though some have got it a great deal righter than others. No place has managed to grow fast and still have affordable housing, smooth short commutes and positive attitudes to growth. The best we can hope to do is to develop efforts in mitigation of the worst social problems that arise.

Among the accumulated wisdom assembled at this conference, and in the libraries of urban literature, I think that the following propositions are almost indisputable.

First, it pays to plan boldly to decentralize jobs and homes together to the very fringe of the commuter field, and even beyond. This will require a framework of public action, even if much of the resulting investment will come from the private sector.

Secondly, such a program must be based on maximum accessibility by transit, including both good quality conventional transit and also state-of-the-art technologies that cater for new patterns of travel demand.

Thirdly, such a system is likely to work better and to be more financially viable if it is based on a system of density pyramids and corridors, such that the maximum possible number of homes and jobs are within easy transit access.

Fourthly, mechanisms must be found of collecting from the private sector some of the development gains in order to meet the impacts on the community, and to use these gains so as to assist the least advantaged members of the local community, particularly through provision of affordable housing.

Fifthly, despite protestations to the contrary, none of this is likely to happen very readily or efficiently without some kind of overall regional strategic plan, and that requires a strategic planning agency in some form or other.

These truths seem to me self-evident. I hope you find them equally so. In that case, perhaps we can spend the rest of the evening discussing how to get to where we want to go.

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CHICAGO REGIONAL GROWTH: A CASE STUDY IN LOCALISM

Elizabeth L. Hollander

The Chicago Metro Region is a case study in the growth patterns of a region in which the commonly seen effects of major highway construction in the 1950s and 'white flight' from the inner city, (or more neutrally, a growing preference for suburban living among the middle class) and the search for cheap land for industrial and residential development have been exaggerated by a dominance of governmental power at the municipal level and minimum regulation or interruption of market forces.

The result is that an overall modest growth of 18% in population since 1960 is distributed in a very uneven pattern. There are major subregional clusters which have long outgrown the basic highway and transit pattern which can be envisaged as a series of 'fingers' reaching out from the centre city.

This paper examines the forces which have determined this pattern of uneven sprawl growth, the economic and social costs of such a pattern, and the innovative 'bottom up' cooperative solutions which are currently being forged by municipalities to overcome some of its effects.

Let me try to paint a picture of the region for you. The Chicago Metropolitan Area is comprised of 6 counties covering 3,660 square miles stretching in a fan shape from the shores of Lake Michigan. The regional population in 1986 was 7.3 million, 3 million in the City of Chicago comprising 228 square miles, or a density of 13,156 persons per square mile. Chicago is in the County of Cook, whose suburbs include another 2.3 million people (a 42% growth since 1960) living in densities of 3,000 per square mile. Chicago and Cook County are dominated by the Democratic party and have been for decades. The majority of the minority population of the region lives in Chicago and Cook County. The centre of the city has been experiencing a sustained development boom over the last several decades, particularly in the 1980s, the 10 billion dollar decade, during which downtown commercial space increased 33% to over 100 million square feet, and new residential construction brought 100,000 residents to the centre. The centre is served by existing rapid transit and commuter rail service. Until 1980 the city was losing population, but is now stabilized and is showing slight growth. Forty percent of the city's population is now African American, almost 20% is Hispanic.

The five collar counties include DuPage, directly to the west, which has grown 132% since 1960 to 727,000 (2,000 persons per square mile); Lake to the north with 39% growth (1,000 persons per square mile); and three more exurban counties—McHenry,

Kane, Will (working north to south)—with 260 to 600 persons per square mile. All of the collar counties are Republican.

Now that you have a picture of the region, let me try to communicate the singular governmental structure of Illinois. Illinois reflects, more than any other state in the nation, a localist, entrepreneurial approach to government. Illinois has more local governments than any other state in the United States—6,627 at last count. The Chicago region contains 262 municipalities, over 100 townships, and 1,000 separate taxing bodies (such as mosquito abatement districts).

The municipalities function under a state constitution that makes it easier to incorporate a new municipality than to annex land. There is no state law governing developments of regional impact such as large shopping centres, major industrial centres, or airports. In addition, it is a state government which has no consistent set of regions across the state to which it delivers services. Each state department handles regions under different clusters.

Perhaps most important, the major source of revenue for municipalities is the property tax. This means that to the extent a municipality can attract commercial and industrial development, it can reduce the tax burden on its residents and provide high quality public services such as schools. It should also be noted that many municipalities in NE Illinois are governed by non-partisan mayors of village presidents, and managed by professional city managers who are disdainful of the political county government systems.

Are there no mechanisms to offset or coordinate the efforts of all these entities? County government has traditionally had limited functions but does provide planning services (except Cook). However, counties must negotiate with municipalities to see that plans are carried out. More on counties later.

Governmental Fragmentation

The regional governmental mechanisms include three entities, one with responsibility for comprehensive planning, the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission (NIPC); the second for transportation planning the Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS); and the third for transit operations the Regional Transit Authority (RTA). I will describe them in ascending order of their power.

The weakest of these organizations is the comprehensive planning agency. NIPC was created in 1957 by state charter with responsibility for research, technical assistance, and comprehensive plans and policies which are non-binding. It is governed by 32 commissioners: 5 represent the Chicago Mayor; 5 the Governor; 3 Cook County Board; one each from the other 5 counties; 7 are elected by an Assembly of Mayors in the region; the RTA, CTA (city transit), Metra (commuter rail), Pace (suburban bus), the

Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, Illinois Association of Park Districts and Chicago Park Board all have one representative. NIPC's budget in 1989 was $2.3 million, $1 million for local governments. It receives no general operating funds from state government. In 1968 NIPC published a 'finger plan' which anticipated the region's growth and recommended it be concentrated around existing commuter rail lines which reached like fingers from the centre of the city. Its recommendations were ignored.

The entity guiding transportation planning has slightly more power because of its relationship to federal budgets, but it suffers from being a single system agency.

The Chicago Area Transportation Authority (CATS), created in 1955, coordinates transportation planning and programming and meets the federal requirement for a metropolitan planning organization. It has a 20 member policy committee which includes the Illinois Department of Transportation Secretary, the Chairman of the Council of Mayors, the Executive Director of the State Tollway Authority, the Commissioner of Public Works of the City, the 6 counties, RTA, CTA, METRA, railroad companies, mass transit districts, private transportation providers, NIPC, FHWA, and UMTA. There are also councils of mayors of suburban municipalities which set priorities for local projects. CATS' budget for 1988 was $3 million. (Note that this budget is 1/3 larger than NIPC's) CATS can exercise control over transportation planning (roads) because federal funds will not be made available to facilities which are not reflected in CATS plans. Of the 23,000 miles of roads in NE Illinois, 6,000 of them are federally funded. Responsibility for maintenance of those roads is, once again, fragmented between the State (3,200 miles); counties (2,000 miles); townships (4,200 miles) and municipalities (13,600 miles).

Chicago's most successful regional coordinating mechanism is the Regional Transit Authority (RTA).

The RTA was created in 1974 to coordinate the regional transportation system in northeastern Illinois. It was reorganized in 1983 to give fiscal oversight to the system, and delegate operating responsibility to three boards: the CTA—city transit; PACE—suburban bus; and METRA—commuter rail.

It is funded by a 1% sales tax in Cook county, and 0.25% sales tax in the collar counties. 15% goes into the RTA fund, 85% to the service board by formula. There is a 50% fare box receipt requirement for the whole system. Monies for the system are also provided by a Public Transportation Fund (state appropriation equal to 25% of RTA sales tax receipt); Federal Mass Transit Funds; and a special appropriation of $35 million by the state for reduced fares for students and the handicapped. The RTA's 1989 expenditures were $1.03 billion with revenues of $540 million or 52.28%. The 1987 ridership was 610,800,000 on the CTA; 35,564,000 on suburban bus; 66,677,000 on Metra. The RTA has prepared a strategic plan for the entire transit system, and a long term capital budget to accompany it. It has recently won a $1 billion appropriation from the legislature toward capital improvements.

The projected capital expenditure need for transit and roads to the year 2010 is $13 billion for highway and $12.5 billion for transit. Twenty (20) billion of this 25.5 billion is designated for maintenance of the existing system. I should also add that there are a number of private and not-for profit regional groups, including the Metropolitan Planning Council (MPC), a non-profit citizens advocacy group for planning which regularly publishes papers on regional needs and brings together public and private interests concerned with regional issues in a forum called the Regional Partnership. MPC helped to craft the RTA legislation. There is also the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club, a business organization that concerns itself with the regional economy. You now have a clear picture of the strength of local government and the general weakness of county and regional governments.

What about the role of market forces? There has been a concentration of job growth in several north and western suburban areas. Why were these areas chosen? Cheap available land is clearly one reason, but that was available in many places. Location studies of industry and commerce show that the most influential factor is the place of the firm's chief executive officer. It is not surprising then to find much growth in the same general location as the most elegant suburban communities in which CEOs are likely to reside.

Let us now outline how the development of the region has been affected by this structure.

- development of scattered major centres outside the city in 1980-2010;
- in the period 1980-1985, dramatic growth has taken place in the centre and around the city and there has been a decline in the city neighbourhoods—this is a short period which is characteristic of longer range trends;
- in the period 1980-1985, there was an employment shift to the suburbs, to DuPage County in particular;
- household growth has been larger than population, travel and employment growth which are parallel, reflecting regional growth patterns;
- it is anticipated that there will be continued expansion over much land area with relatively low density; and
- highway traffic congestion is demonstrated in th high number of arterial whose capacity is exceeded and will continue to be in the next 20 years.

This last point is a very good introduction to discussing the costs of this growth pattern. Let us start with transportation costs. In February 1990, the Chicago Tribune published a six part feature story called 'Choking on Growth' which described in vivid terms the transportation costs of unplanned growth. One article describes the harrowing two hour trip of one urban worker to travel 37 miles, another estimates a 1987 $2 billion annual cost in fuel expenses and delays (based on $500 each for 3.9 million cars). A third article describes the threat of the Environmental Protection Agency to cut off $350 million in federal highway funds because of excessive air pollution.

At the same time the transportation planners are struggling to devise sensible strategies to cope with this growth over the long term, they must react to immediate needs generated without thoughtful planning.

The most striking recent example is the decision of Sears to move 5,200 employees from the downtown Sears Tower to northwest suburban Hoffman Estates. This move was supported by $60 million of state subsidy in a hasty decision forced by Sears' threat to leave the state. It was done without consultation with either the regional planning commission or the Chicago Area Transportation Study. The village of Hoffman Estates had a major development site available and, in entrepreneurial fashion characteristic of the region, worked a deal with the state and Sears.

Currently, 95% of Sears employees at the Sears Tower use public transportation to get to work—it is, after all, at the centre of the city's CTA and Commuter rail network. The site of the new Sears suburban complex is 8 miles from the nearest commuter rail station. Only 15 Sears employees reside in the community to which Sears is moving, 1800 reside in the City of Chicago. In order to get workers to the site, plans are being made for 17 round trips by shuttle buses from commuter stations, including two CTA lines. In addition, van pools and car pools are being organized as well as subscription bus services from suburbs as far away as twenty miles away. Metra is seeking support for a new rail line along an old railroad right-of-way that will cost $53 million, and the highway department is building a new interchange and road widening to reach the site. This will increase the state subsidy to $100 million.

Sears will, of course, be building acres of parking lots. One other striking cost of spread development is that 1,360 square feet of parking space is needed for each 1,000 square feet of office space.

It is important to ask, at this point, whether this sprawl development is entirely negative. After all, a recent report from the Civic Committee mentioned earlier says that the Chicago area economy has surged in the last six years and the overall job growth here now generally matches the national average. Between 1984 and 1989, the Chicago region was the 5th major metropolitan job growth area in the nation (up from 14th in 1982). As we have seen, most of that growth happened in the suburbs to the north and west of the city and in the very centre of Chicago. Meanwhile, Chicago neighbourhoods and southern suburbs have been losing employment.

The difficulty is that the job growth areas are isolated from the job needy populations located in the city and older ring suburbs. According to NIPC, the number of low income jobs in Chicago's suburbs increased by more than 130,000 or 17% between 1980 and 1986. However, during that same period, the supply of affordable housing dropped by 35,000 units, or a loss of 12%. There are no state or regional requirements for the growth suburban communities to provide low cost housing in their communities. As we have earlier indicated, taxing considerations are disincentives for doing so. Racial class prejudices further exacerbate this problem. The upshot is that high growth suburbs such as Oak Brook and Schaumberg have less than 18% of their labour force living in their communities. In Schaumberg (with an employee base of 32,000) a recent study found that 9% of the employees commuted at least 25 miles to work. Suburban employers such as MacDonalds are paying as much as twice the minimum wage to attract workers.

It is this situation which has helped to drive the number of cars per population in the region from 39 per 100 in 1979 to 56 per 100 in 1988. It is also these conditions which severely limit the access of low-income job needy population to the fastest growing job area in the region. Many low-income city residents do not own cars, and many jobs are not accessible by public transportation.

NIPC has adopted a policy urging suburban communities to build low-income housing in relation to their low-income jobs to improve poor ratios that now are as high as 5 to 10 to 1 jobs to low cost housing stock. (Moderate cost housing is also badly needed to house a growing elderly population in the suburbs.) However, once again, there is no enforcement mechanism for such policies.

We now have demonstrated that the region is paying a high price in transportation and economic costs for its development pattern. Of course, along with the economic costs of the distance between workers and jobs, there is a great social cost in isolating job needy, often minority populations from the employment opportunities. This social cost is exacerbated by the variable quality of education that is provided across the region. As we noted earlier, suburban municipalities rely on their property tax base to fund local schools. The result is that rich communities have very fine schools, poorer communities have much poorer schools. There is a state-wide drive to improve education, including education of inner-city children which is bringing to the fore, for the first time, the possibility that the state should equalize school funding among all the school districts.

The additional price that is paid for sprawl development, of course, is the dramatic change in quality of life. Rolling meadows no longer meander through the suburban countryside. Flooding has increased as floodplains are built upon and wetlands filled in. The result is that pressure to move even further out is continuing, as people seek a more rural environment. The 6 county region is fast becoming an 11

county area that includes parts of Wisconsin and Indiana. It is a vast region that exaggerated the social distance between the city and suburban dweller, rich and poor.

The depths of the social distance between the city and suburbs has been captured in a humorous column by Bill Granger who writes in a column entitled 'The city-suburbs gap: Maybe its in the genes.'

'Suburbanites know by instinct that only poor people walk. If God had not intended us to drive everywhere, He would not have given us wheels. When suburbanites see walkers, they are afraid because walkers are up to no good. They call the cops on walkers in suburbs. I am not making this up.'

I hope I have, by now, painted a clear picture of the negative effects of allowing a region to grow without a plan. Now, let me turn to some of the positive efforts being undertaken in the region at a *sub-regional* level that may be instructive to you as municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area seek to find acceptable regional approaches. After all, the sub-regions in the Chicago area are as large as some metropolitan areas.

There are some nine effective sub-regions in Chicago metropolitan area: Chicago; the north, central, and southern portions of Cook County outside of Chicago; and the five outlying counties. Cooperative efforts were given a boost by new state constitution in 1970 that gave units of local government the authority to contract and associate among themselves with the State, and with other states and their units of local government and school districts. By 1975, there were over 800 intergovernmental agreements addressing provision of services and facilities ranging from fire protection to law enforcement. In 1985, 95% of 100 surveyed municipalities reported intergovernmental agreements. These agreements were generally characterized by the following: they provide basic local services, often ones invisible to the general public, involve little new capital investment and seldom involve areas of high risk or conflict. It is instructive to note, however, that these pragmatic cooperative approaches to provide essential low-key services have, at least in some cases, provided a base of trust on which to build new government structures to address more difficult problems.

In a few instances, voluntary municipal associations have been formed which act as subregional governments providing sophisticated staff to address such issues as solid waste and storm water management. The most advanced of these, the Northwest Municipal Conference, actually created a Solid Waste Agency representing 32 northern Cook County municipalities which has purchased a site for location of a balefill. In spite of a lengthy and conflictual approval process, only two municipalities have withdrawn and the rest have adopted a plan and recycling practises which have reduced their sub-regions' waste stream by 38%. It is hard to stress sufficiently what an accomplishment it is for municipalities to act jointly on solid waste siting.

The next stage of development entails municipalities working cooperatively with the county government. In DuPage County, municipal cooperation in regional planning

is being achieved by the adoption of a cluster planning process in which groups of communities having a common interest in development policies considered jointly the aggregate impact of development plans. In several cases this has led to the reduction of non-residential densities in municipal zoning ordinances to match allowable growth to available infrastructure.

The next development stage has recently evolved in which actual power for planning, taxation and action on issues requiring a broader view is delegated to the county level as long as significant municipal input is retained.

A particularly innovative municipal/county planning approach has been developed to address stormwater management. In 1987, the state legislature adopted legislation which empowered all northeastern Illinois counties (except Cook) to plan, finance, and manage stormwater in cooperation with municipalities.

A central feature of the law was the formation of stormwater management planning committees consisting of equal number of county board and municipal representatives from each county board district. Their duty is to present a plan which the county then has the legislative power to fund through a county property tax.

Lake County is the furthest along in this process. They have devised a plan and a review policy that allocates revenue to 16 watersheds based on the portion of tax derived from the residents of the watershed. They have also adopted a minimum regulatory policies to ensure that new development does not cause downstream flooding. Success is not yet ensured as there is conflict with the county board and the County Health Department which enforces wetland legislation, but many are optimistic.

It is anticipated that the future will see a growth in the role of counties (particularly outside Cook). We have discussed above the leadership role provided by several counties. At this point, special state legislation has been required each time but has been won through local initiative.

In review we see that establishing trust between municipal officials to the point of delegating power is a slow, iterative process. It starts with voluntary municipal association and mundane tasks where governmental styles and interests are easily shared. Eventually tougher issues and county cooperation can be achieved. This is hastened by pressing reality such as an absence of landfill space, rapidly rising garbage disposal costs, as is the case of Lake County, devastating floods.

It is difficult for an outsider to assess the relationship between GTA's 25 municipalities and the five upper tier governments, but material provided seems to indicate a political climate and local control of land use regulation which is familiar to us in the Chicago metro area. An ambivalent attitude of provincial government toward upper tier governments sounds much like state/county and regional relationships.

I hope I have accomplished my two aims in this talk. The first is to illustrate why it is essential to overcome localism to address future growth. The health of each of your localities requires it. Secondly, I hope to have shown you some approaches to doing do.

I look forward to giving further explication of our situation (including, if you like, our transportation approaches to the future) in this and other sessions. Chicago is in many ways a case study in how not to do it. On the other hand, our preference for the most local government has made us entrepreneurial in finding voluntary approaches to working together. I thank you for this opportunity to share with you what the comic strip character Pogo has called our 'insurmountable opportunities'.

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ILLUSION OR DELUSION: POLITICS AND PLANNING IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY REGION

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Abstract

Too often we focus on growth as the cause of congestion, overcrowding, deteriorating infrastructure, and environmental degradation. Growth is not the problem per se. Rather, inadequate planning, poor public policy and institutional conflicts are the primary causes. The nature of the democratic decision-making process may inherently create management inefficiencies that produce this conflict.

This paper examines the recent development history of communities within the San Francisco Bay Region. Specifically, it looks at the changing economic and demographic factors affecting the spatial structure of this region, and the forces which have relegated the historical central city, the City of San Francisco, to being one, but not the, primary player in the development of the Bay Area. It points to the contradictions in public policy with respect to understanding the linkage of economic prosperity to providing housing sites. Discussion moves to the success of local growth management, and its failure in the context of regional development. Recent events at redirecting growth within this region are discussed emphasizing that successful public policy requires a linkage between good analysis and good politics.

Finally, it asks that all important question: 'Is it possible to successfully manage growth or are we doomed like Sisyphus, only to learn that there is no steady-state solution to manage our future?'

Introduction

Webster's Dictionary defines illusion as the 'state or fact of intellectually deceived or misled' and delusion as 'something that is falsely or delusively believed or propagated'. In either cases, you will note that it does not suggest that someone else was creating the illusion or encouraging the decision. In short, we ourselves usually are responsible for the above action. At this point, you ask me: 'How does this relate to Politics and Planning in the San Francisco Bay Region?'. And I answer: 'Probably, only by example, since I am sure that you Canadians are just as afflicted by the diseases of illusion and delusion.'

Politicians surely would like to have words like 'failure' removed from the language; I know planners certainly would. You do not win elections by telling the electorate that you cannot manage your jurisdiction's growth. You certainly do not win friends in the planning community by saying that we may not be able to successfully manage the present because the dynamics of change are always one step ahead of policy. Some have argued that planners have failed to fully understand who are winners and losers in the development game, and that the dynamics of urban development is far more important and complicated than to leave to one discipline.

The Problem

Charles Yost once wrote that, 'Democracy is not a matter of sentiment, but of foresight. Any system that does not take the long run into account will burn itself out in the short run.' (*The Age of Triumph and Frustration*). This is why we are gathered here today. Urbanization inherently creates conflict. Managing that conflict is a key issue that must be discussed. Not resolving it, but managing it. We must come to recognize that conflict within the urban environment naturally arises from change. Therefore, the problem is not conflict, but rather the inability of public planning, as a management tool, to anticipate structural and spatial changes caused by economic dynamics. There are several potential sources of this inability to manage conflict (or growth) effectively.

One source is public institutional mechanisms that view urban growth as a problem to be solved within political boundaries, as opposed to boundaries that are determined by the economy, the population distribution and the communication network designed to permit interaction within the economy.

Another sources of failure comes from the inability of planners to recognize the dynamics of economic processes. This failure leads to ineffective and sometimes destructive public policy. The growth management movement is clearly an example of this failure. Although the broad objectives made sense, the policies that tend to flow from growth management programs create market distortions, encourage the rise in speculative land values and generally focus on the foot-prints of events that created congestion or too much growth. Too often, the debate focuses on the growth as the cause of congestion, over-crowding, a deterioration or underutilized infrastructure and environmental degradation. Growth is not the problem per se. Rather, bad planning, along with contradictory public policy and institutional conflict create the conditions that cause the above.

A final source may derive from our psychological inability to understand that problems may not be solvable; that we cannot control, but at best, can only hope to manage and stay one step ahead of the next problem that may afflict our environment.

Focusing on the Reality of Today: A Look at the San Francisco Bay Area

Background

The San Francisco Bay Area has a population of 5.9 million (1990). The population is expected to increase to 6.8 million by 2005. In 1990, there will be 3.0 million jobs in the Bay Area and that number is expected to jump to 3.9 million by 2005. San Francisco accounts for about one-sixth of the region's jobs. Long-term future demand represents a slowdown from historical trends. Future growth is expected to reach only 76 percent of the historical job additions from 1972-1989. Over the next fifteen years, the employed labour supply within the nine-county region is expected to grow by about 580,000 individuals. Between 1970 and 1990, the employed labour grew by 1.3 million. This slowdown in the growth of the labour supply is attributed to three factors: a) peaking of labour force participation for both males and females, b) population aging, and c) lack of housing construction commensurate with demand within the nine-county region. Housing construction is highly dependant upon local development policies. These policies have tended to place constraints on housing production and, at the same time, sought to maximize efforts to attract employment opportunities. This combination of the above is expected to increase commuting into the job centres within the Bay Area.

By 2005, the existing nine-county Bay Area will probably have expanded (in economic terms) to at least twelve counties: two additional counties in the valley easy of Alameda and Contra Costa counties and one county south of Santa Clara County. This congestion will lengthen the congestion points in the existing freeway network, since it is assumed that a major fraction of these workers will commute by car. At the same time, public policy within the existing nine counties of the Bay Area has emphasized providing land sites for economic opportunities over housing sites. The results of this policy are evident: high housing costs, declining affordability, longer commutes. The existing trend is creating contradictions that will do serious damage to both the local economies, the social structure of these communities within the core of the region and will reduce environmental quality.

Economics Affects Decisions

Individuals and business seek solutions that tend to minimize both personal and organizational costs. Within the Bay Area, this has resulted in the spatial decentralization of both economic activity and residential living patterns. Some will correctly argue that spatial decentralization is a rational cost minimization response. The result of this process has been the historical centres of employment in the Bay Area have become less significant in the overall performance of the region's economic system. By the Mid-1970s, residential development patterns in the Bay Area were decentralizing rapidly. The City of Concord in Contra Costa County is a case in point. In 1950, Concord had a population of 5,953. By the 1980 Census, the population had ballooned to 103,255. Growth in Concord was significantly influenced by cheap land and good access to employment centres, such as San Francisco.

While traditional manufacturing employment centres like Oakland and Richmond suffered substantial job loss in the 1970s, office and corporate centres like San Francisco prospered. Between 1972 and 1980, San Francisco added almost 100,000 jobs to its economy. Transportation access was a key factor in this situation. The investments of the 1960s in highways and the opening of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system permitted suburban residential growth and concentrated employment centres. Although no analysis has been done, trip lengths probably increased substantially in the 1970s. As such, the 1960s and 1970s probably will be known as the suburbanization era of the Bay Area.

The 1980s will be known as the era of employment and decentralization. National tax policies, high land costs in the employment growth centres of the 1970s, information technology and the rapid increase in the number of women in the labour supply contributed to this process. The suburban centres of the 1960s and 1970s became the urban centres of the 1980s. What happened to the distribution of jobs in the 1980s?

San Francisco—the historical central city of the Bay Area had relative job stagnation in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1989, San Francisco added only about 18,500 jobs, substantially down from the 1970s when almost 100,000 new jobs were added to its economy. Historical suburban centres, such as Concord and Walnut Creek in Contra Costa County and Pleasanton, Fremont and Hayward in Alameda County, have become major centres of job growth. Are these centres still suburban? I think not. The high technology centres which generate the most income and provide the highest average wages in the Bay Area are located in Santa Clara County in the cities of San Jose, Sunnyvale and Miltipas. These cities were clearly suburban cities of the 1970s. In fact, San Francisco no longer has the largest population in the Bay Area. San Jose surpassed it as early as 1988 as the largest city in the San Francisco Bay Area.

All of this speaks directly to job and population decentralization. As my friend, Dr. Walter Hoadley, former Chief Economist for the Bank of America, once said: 'San Francisco has become the hole in the doughnut'.

Decentralizing land use patterns have created havoc with the transportation system. For example, the rapid transit system in the Bay Area is linked to an existing network that is increasingly outside the job and population growth centres. At the same time, the traditional urban centres are being left with a narrower spectrum of jobs. Central location is still important for corporate activity, but less so for support organizations that make up the bulk of jobs. The next ten to twenty years will offer significant challenges. Demographics has affected the growth in the labour force. Yet, the demand for labour will continue to increase. Housing prices in the Bay Area have reached the level which affects not only individual affordability but also economic location decisions.

Some will suggest that this growing imbalance between the demands of the economy and the inability of public policy to provide more than a minimal level of

housing sites can be resolved by driving up the cost of doing business in the Bay Area. This will reduce jobs demands of the economy in the Bay Area because business will seek to minimize locational and operational costs. This solution is fraught with significant social and economic costs. The jobs likely to be affected are those that ring the Bay. That is, in northern Alameda County, San Francisco, San Meteo and northern Santa Clara counties. Job growth in suburban areas, such as: Solano county, in the Pleasanton-Livermore-San Ramon areas, central Sonoma and southern Santa Clara counties will most likely not be affected. That is, areas that are on the fringes of the existing nine-county region will not be affected by this stress between growth in the job demand and the availability of labour. The labour supply in these areas and adjacent counties will continue to grow directly because of housing production.

Corporate centres will probably remained centralized in the core of this region. Firms that service the strategic planning and operations of large corporations will continue to locate close to those operations. Advertising, legal services and a variety of business services will remain centralized. These jobs command more specialized skills and education.

What results is a limited spectrum of jobs in the core of the region: upper income, highly skilled jobs and an increasing number of lower income jobs that service both central corporate operations and the firms that agglomerate around them. Competition for housing will likely be between the skilled upper income workers and the lower income service workers within the central core of the Bay Area. Ihlandfeldt and Sjoquist (Journal of Urban Economics 26, 110-130, 1989) have found that 'job decentralization has a substantial negative impact on earnings of workers with a high school education or less, living in central cities.' The combination of locational and educational factors in many communities points to the potential for rising social tension within the core of the Bay Area. Job losses in the central Bay Area will most likely come from the middle income group.

There is growing evidence that the 'foot-loose' jobs fall into the category of cost-sensitive jobs, e.g., firms or operations in which labour or locational costs becomes obvious inhibitors of profitability. Technology has permitted firms to relocate functional units easily. Therefore, back-office types of operations or blue collar jobs not tied to locationally dependant users of their products will tend to seek the least-cost solution. Most of the people employed in these operations fall into the middle income category.

Regional Decentralization May Only Reflect the Adjustment of the Economy to Supply and Demand Imbalances

Peter Druker argues that the city, as we know it, is obsolete. It is a 19th century product based upon 19th century ability to move people. Clearly, the market is changing based upon a new set of constraints: some based upon competitive position, others based upon technology and the way it affects organizational structure, and yet others based upon public policies affecting where we locate jobs and housing.

It is critical for planners to understand that the decentralization process of moving jobs closer to places where people live and away from the centre of the region, a movement I would call the 'corporate spatial reorganization' process, may be due to natural economic processes. Today, there are few economic incentives to centralize operational functions of corporations, as opposed to strategic planning and central management functions. Is this process of business decentralization good or bad from a policy of perspective? How does it affect transportation, environmental maintenance, income or employment policy? I'm not sure.

What should not be missed here is that public policy or the lack thereof may accelerate this process or slow it down. Anecdotal evidence suggests that one cause of the decentralization of selective types of jobs away from the core of the region is the lack of affordable housing production. Although technology and organization changes in the functional structure of the economy may be creating the environmental conditions for job decentralization, public policy definitely is stimulating the rate of decentralization. This is the issue being faced in the San Francisco Bay Area.

Conditions in Public Policy with Respect to Understanding the Linkage between Economic Prosperity and Providing Housing Sites

One of the critical reasons for rapid decentralization of the region's economy comes from not understanding the linkage between economic prosperity and housing production. Before undertaking the biannual economic and demographic forecast, we survey local governments with respect to their development policies. This we define as supply analysis. The most recent inventory of available sites for development over the next fifteen years gathered from zoning, development policies and general plans of local governments indicates a potential for 645,900 new dwelling units in the Bay Area.

Optimistically, 577,900 units probably will be available because of infrastructure development problems. The operative word 'minimum' is critical. The research staff of the Association of Bay Area Governments estimates a housing demand of over 700,000 *new households* over this period. In short, given existing development policies, the entire inventory of potential housing will likely be consumed.

At the same time, approximately 71,200 gross acres of land have been between identified as available in the Bay Area for commercial and industrial development. The latest economic forecast for job growth in the Bay Area indicates a demand for about 21,000 gross commercial and industrial acres over the forecast period. What does this point toward: A contradiction in public policy with respect to linking economic development strategies to providing sites for housing.

The root cause of this contradiction in California rests in local growth management strategies, and in the unique nature of public initiatives passed by California voters, such as Proposition 13 in 1978, that have severely limited the ability of

local governments to raise revenues. The impact that has lead to distortions in the housing market, affective and affordability. This, in turn, is now affecting job locations and the spectrum of jobs in communities. There are obviously short-term tax benefits from a development policy that maximizes job growth over providing housing in this era of government by propositions. Commercial and industrial development, on the average, costs the community less and generates more revenue than residential development. There are also political benefits since there is less citizen resistance to new job development than to new housing in their community.

The Success of Local Growth Management, and Its Failure in the Context of Regional Development

Although growth management programs have been viewed as elitist, reflecting self-enrichment, and exclusivity, growth management activity is stimulated by citizen perceptions of severe fiscal and environment concerns. In the San Francisco Bay Area, local growth management programs have come about primarily in response to concern over traffic congestion and the impact of rapid residential development on the fiscal capacity of a community to provide services needs. They have taken the forms of measures to limit building permits for residential units or the amount of space available for job growth. In addition to the above, measures may require employers or developers to pay mitigation or development fees to cover public cost of development.

Local governments have increasingly sought to find creative revenues source in the wake of more than ten years of measures by citizens to limit local and state governments taxing capacity. This has resulted in shifting the costs of development directly on those who may move to the community. Some will argue that this is where the cost should be placed. However, there are equity issues here. There are economic issues also since this pricing system will build inflationary pressures into the system.

The combination of measures to physically limit growth and to shift the direct cost of growth to the developer and hence either the employer or residential user has probably had the effect of limiting growth in the *specific community in question*. It has limited growth by raising the cost. Dowall (1984) in his book, 'The Suburban Squeeze', suggests that in the Bay Area growth management programs have added 20-35 percent to the price of a new house. This, in turn, affects then entire housing market.

In communities like San Francisco and Walnut Creek, a suburban office centre in the eastern part of the Bay Area, efforts to minimize the impact of growth focused upon ways to limit employment growth by reducing the square footage of office space available. In both cases employment growth did decline after the initiatives.

However, the question is: Was there a cause and effect relationship between the employment decline and the initiatives? In both cases, employment growth would have declined because of the cost of space. In the early 1980s, the spread between the price of prime office space in San Francisco and communities in other parts of the Bay Area was

four or five times greater. As noted earlier, the need to centralize office operations declined rapidly as we entered the 1980s. The decentralization of employment was well underway by the time the initiatives passed. What did the initiative do? In both San Francisco and Walnut Creek, the initiatives probably accelerated the employment decentralization that was primarily due to market conditions—not planning constraints.

Many growth management measures are *in response to events that are not now happening*. In the case of San Francisco, the policy instrument enacted probably has lead to further decentralization of jobs away from transit corridors and towards more auto dependency: certainly not an environmentally sound solution. Should we do nothing?

The answer lies in two parts. Politically, it would be suicidal not to deal with the issue. Therefore, growth management measures will continue to be passed.

One might cynically suggest that the illusion of success by delusion is far better than the alienation created by a government appearing to be paralysed by its inability to manage the direction of a community. Second, it is critical that we recognize that market forces already may be working to minimize the impact of a development problem. The market is a powerful instrument that seeks to minimize costs associated with location. These costs could be transportation, land or labour. In the case of San Francisco, one might argue that the policy to limit growth in the downtown was similar to putting out the fire after the building burnt down. That is, it is likely that job growth in San Francisco would have declined regardless of the growth control policy because of the economic forces that were well underway to decentralize the employment base. This is also true for the grow controls in Walnut Creek. *The critical point is: public policy, as related to managing growth, seems to follow the market, not direct or lead it.*

This is not necessarily a priori. Rather it is reflective of both the inadequacy of planning—which may be inherent—and the nature of democratic decision-making which functions far better in crisis management than in long-range planning.

What might be learned from these growth management measures—whether residential or focused upon employment growth? First, they are legitimate responses of citizens or communities to the effects of growth. Second, there is ample evidence that they raise the cost of land and may actually result in greater *regional sprawl*. (*Understanding Growth Management: Critical Issues and Research Agenda*, ULI, 1989). Third it raised issues about the ability of public policy to successfully manage the future or the present. Fourth, and most important, growth management programs tend to transfer and redistribute wealth—favouring the property class, who are generally older and more wealthier, to the disadvantage of renters, middle income wage earners and young families. William A. Fischel, in his article, 'What Do Economists Know About Growth Controls? A Research Review,' (ULI, 1989)

'The long-run effect of this is a lower standard of living...Inefficiently withdrawing land from development forces builders to look elsewhere in the

metropolitan area. The most likely sites are in the ex-urban and rural communities, where the political climate, at least initially, is more favourable to development. ...People will commute more than they would otherwise ...reducing real income.'

What can be learned? Growth management clearly has a political constituency that is both strong and growing. There are legitimate and pressing reasons to manage the urban environment to minimize the negative impact of growth. However, the economic costs and the social tradeoffs must become part of *the mainstream discussion about the growth management*. There are real losers and winners.

Economic Interdependency: The Political Consequences

The change in the economic and population structure of the San Francisco Bay Area has also affected the political structure of the region. Today there are more than one hundred cities within the nine counties. The impact of this decentralization has been to defuse the political decision-making. As would be expected, younger communities view the central core communities with suspicion. Some have viewed the layout of the Bay Area Rapid Transit system (BART) as a means to maintain the political and economic power of San Francisco to their community's disadvantage. BART clearly was designed by planners to maintain a 'City-Centred' development patterned after the Bay Area. 'City-Centred', as originally defined in the 1960s in this context, probably was to maintain Oakland and San Francisco as the primary employment centres, while the surrounding region would serve as the suburban residential centre. It is classical planning without regard to economics.

The political leadership in these 'suburban communities' increasingly had a different view of their community from that of the planners. And this is basic psychology. People view their community as whole, not as a place to service the needs of some other community. Politicians simply reflect the sentiment of their constituents.

If we are to be successful at regional planning, we must understand that concepts like urban-suburban may not depict a picture of equity in the minds of some; rather, it may create the image of dependency. This image creates alienation and intensifies competition. Therefore, it is critical that an image (or illusion) of equality among communities becomes an essential first step to creating a regional vision of community. The approach in the Bay Area has been to minimize the potential conflict between communities and to create an image of regionalism by pointing out the regional nature of the economy, the growing interdependency and the fact that the traditional political approach—city vs. suburb—will not lead to solutions.

Successful Public Policy Requires Good Analysis and Good Politics

Good Analysis is Necessary for Successful Public Policy

Too often, we lament the lack of administrative authority to manage growth. You hear the cries of bureaucracy: 'IF WE ONLY HAD THE POWER—THIS WOULD BE A

BETTER...'. It is certainly true that administrative authority will get things done FASTER—but not necessarily BETTER. There are organizations of planning that have enormous power and yet have failed in their own objectives. Too often, we fail because the instruments of public policy simply will not do what they are suppose to do or may create secondary impacts that were not clearly thought out. I have presented several today. Part of the reason lies in what amounts to poor analysis. Part of the blame for this rests in planning education which does not emphasize the rigors of hard-core economics enough. There are far too many examples in the Bay Area where well-intentioned public policy has led to higher housing costs, migration of middle income jobs and questionable improvements 'in the quality of life'. A case in point is the 'down-zoning'. Planners rarely consider the economic consequences of reducing density standards in neighbourhoods with high demand for housing. Understandably, planners are responding to the wants of neighbourhood residents who want to preserve the character of their living environment, and politically, responding to this need makes sense. But the economics of 'downzoning' has serious impacts on producing affordable housing. And this, in turn, affects the distribution of jobs and housing in an area thus affecting environmental quality. So the neighbourhood group may want down-zoning to protect their community's integrity, but at the same time, this effort to protect local neighbourhood quality may deteriorate the quality of life for those who are not privileged to live in that community.

What is the issue? Public policy is not neutral. It has the capacity to transfer wealth and take it away. Planners have the responsibility to know the economic impacts and to present the case. If we are to interfere with the market mechanism to give people 'excess profits' by down-zoning, than public policy can take some of those profits away by rent control. Unless planners understand the economics of public policy, well-intentioned moves may prove to be a disaster. Good public policy must contain good analysis.

What is the tactical mechanism used to influence and develop good public policy by the planning and analysis arm of the ABAG? The tactical mechanism used to influence behaviour centres around the economic, social and environmental consequences of existing trends. ABAG, as an administrative organization, has very little power. Power, as an instrument to create change, develops through the use of the media, developing a constituency for change and good analysis. The organization's effectiveness, in an environment of weak administrative power, rests solely on its ability to persuade. Good analysis is the key to this process. Therefore, the strategy is to 'hammer away' at the point that there are few options remaining to stabilize the demographic shifts that will affect the financial and economic health of many communities in the San Francisco Bay Area. And there are signs of optimism. Cities, like San Francisco, are slowly beginning to realize that demographic trends are weakening their competitive position within the region and that local labour supply growth, by providing more sites for housing, will be the major factor in competing for jobs. The process is slow, and yet, it lays the political foundation for compromise which is an integral element of successful policy.

Good Politics is Necessary for Successful Public Policy

In addition to good analysis, good politics plays a critical role in formulating and carrying through successful public policy. Politics has far more traps than analysis because you are dealing with human behaviour. The first rule in good politics is to assume that elected officials will represent their constituency. That is, locally elected city and county officials may think regionally about issues of growth and development, but will vote in a way that either maximizes *their communities' opportunities* or clearly minimizes any damage. The second rule is to use a simple negotiating strategy: two steps forward, one step back. Present proposals which can move you toward your objective, but be prepared for compromise. So any regional solution must contain a combination of the above.

Linking Housing Production to Job Development: A Strategy that Focuses on Commercial and Industrial Land

The scenario has been laid out: decentralizing land use patterns, potential economic and social damage to the core of the San Francisco Bay Area, local growth management programs that limit housing production, increasing auto-dependency with corresponding impact on air quality and a regional planning agency with advisory powers only. The agenda is to minimize the adverse impacts listed above. A proposed solution follows.

The Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), the sister Council of Governments agency in the San Francisco Bay Area, responsible for transportation planning is updating its long-range Regional Transportation Plan. The Transportation Commission requested that the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) develop an alternative regional land use growth scenario that increases transit ridership. The objective was to increase housing production in those corridors where existing or proposed light rail, subway or commuter train are presently located or will run.

As noted earlier, development policies suggest that land set aside for residential growth does not meet the minimal expected demand. However, trying to increase density in existing residential neighbourhoods in the core of the Bay Area generates enormous political opposition. Political leaders therefore are, at best, 'gun-shy'. Communities on the fringe of the region therefore receive the brunt of housing development pressure, with job growth lagging. The combination of these factors create political division and tension among communities in the Bay Area, continues the existing trends and further weakens the overall economic health of the Bay Area.

Correspondingly, land reserved for commercial and industrial growth far exceeds demand. Therefore, the solution sought was to first identify those communities in which job growth exceeded the growth in labour supply. Second, an analysis of the commercial and industrial land needed for future growth over the next twenty years was done to determine the inventory of land remaining after this period. Third,

commercial and industrial land was identified within what was called 'transit-sensitive corridors'. These are corridors which have an existing or proposed stations or are within one mile of the transit line(s). Finally, some fraction of the commercial and industrial land was rezoned for future residential use.

The result was to identify housing on previous commercial and industrially zoned land for 165,000 households in communities which had no residential development sites remaining over this period and in-commuting into the core of the region was reduced by two-thirds. Of the 50,000 gross commercial and industrial acres remaining after 2010, 12,400 gross acres were rezoned for residential use. Residential densities in these potentially new neighbourhoods were similar to surrounding residential areas with the exception of sites next to transit stations. This was critical to minimize local opposition.

Now before you jump up and down and say: 'You did that!', this was only an analysis that suggests that *it is possible to do the above. The land exists.* The analysis was designed to minimize local political opposition in two ways. First, development was concentrated in the core region on excess commercial and industrial land that was rezoned residential land which would not effect *existing* residential neighbourhoods. Second, communities on the fringe of the region would receive very little of this 'alternative zoning' housing. This minimizes the negative political impacts from these communities because they feel most impacted by lack of housing production within the core communities in the Bay Area.

Will it work? The analysis suggests that it can be done. But will it really work? It is difficult to say yes. Getting people to think that time is running out is a very difficult task: case in point, the behaviour of the U.S. Congress in the past several weeks. But the strategy has been to use social psychology and good analysis, to use the media and build alliances based upon the thesis that this can be a 'win-win' scenario.

There are no Guarantees

There is no guarantee that good analysis and good politics will create a successful policy. Good analysis and good politics are *NECESSARY* for successful policy, but the commitment needed to start the critical mass may be lacking.

The public policy problem that is faced today is multi-faceted. Planners help develop a regional rapid transit system with the goal of maintaining high density, centralized employment centres, such as the City of San Francisco. They failed, however, to anticipate that rising land costs and shifts in the labour supply due to residential growth patterns would (naturally) decentralize employment patterns. Public policy has generally been able to successfully anticipate economic and demographic change and its corresponding impacts on existing and future infrastructure. The reason for this sluggishness comes from several sources: some are psychological, some are

institutional, others reflect the political system. Flexibility in thought and awareness of change are not well-known characteristics of the human species. Our social conditioning, for the purposes of maintaining a stable social environment, encourages the opposite.

Institutional mechanisms that manage growth do not respond in a systematic way in the United States. Housing, land use and transportation planning do not function in a coordinated fashion primarily because the resources needed to solve a problem are not systematically applied at the same time. This management inadequacy has its roots in our political views of what is property, governments role and our political views that government is not a promoter of the 'public good', rather it serves as an arbitrator of individual decisions.

There Are No Easy Answers

The nature of a democratic decision process inherently creates these management inefficiencies. The unfortunate truth is that the public policies and the planning mechanisms that are designed to manage growth are structured *to respond* to some past economic or demographic event. And too often, the response institutes management strategies which are no longer relevant to the economic decisions for today's changing technology and cost considerations.

It is apparent that tension will exist between public policies designed to solve problems, citizen perceptions of what is needed, and the way the economic decision process responds to public policy constraints and citizens perceptions. These may be inherent institutional flaws of a democratic system or they may simply represent flaws in the theory and practice of growth management and the way we, as planners, anticipate spatial and temporal change in the urban environment.

Over confidence in our ability to influence the future is a major problem. Too often, we assume that some mythical steady-state solution can be found to the problems of managing the body politic. History has taught us that those who follow such a path enter the world of decline and decay. Increasingly, we must become conscious that our economic future is not guaranteed. The cost of housing, indecision and bickering among public officials on critical planning issues, and a paralysis in both the public and private sectors with respect to some vision of the future and of the means to get there will affect our ability to govern. Most critically, it will weaken the democratic institutional foundation.

What are some conclusions to help us move on this path? First, do not assume that public policy even with good intentions, will not do more damage than repair. Second, understanding the economics or growth is essential to managing it. Finally, remember, all of this is done in the name of 'the people'; let us make sure the people really benefit.

And on a final positive note, let us remember that, like Sisyphus, we can take this burden and realize that it is possible to live and create, even in the very midst of the desert.

4

REGIONAL PLANNING WITHIN THE NEW FRENCH AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT: THE CASE OF THE GREATER PARIS REGION

Gilles Antier

During the past 25 years, the Greater Paris Region has been greatly transformed (Figure 1). For example 1.8 million flats and houses have been built within the Greater Paris Region, the equivalent of half of the existing stock in 1962.

By the end of the 1980's, the general framework had changed, mainly because of the following:

- the economic recovery (18 million square metres of industrial, commercial and other office floor area was permitted between 1985 and 1989);
- the development of a new partnership between local authorities (following the decentralization of 1983), strengthened powers of regional authorities, and new private sector initiatives; and,
- the growth of the international challenges and trends within the basic conceptual framework of a new Regional Project.

The 1976 Master Plan

The 1976 Master Plan, of which the first draft was published in 1965, had been conceived within a context of a high demographic and economic growth, in order to make up for the delays which had characterized the previous 40 years, and to create the best conditions for a rapidly expanding regional population.

The Master Plan proposed:

- a regional public transportation network;
- a hierarchical road network;
- the organization and development of the urban area around several sub-centres, of which the new town policy constitutes the focal point; and,

- the growth of environmental policies and the integration of rural development as a part of regional planning.

But the general framework of the Region has changed:

- the strong economic recovery after 1973-1980, has changed the local behaviour;

- the growing development of private sector initiatives has led to a new partnership with several institutions for new major projects, such as highways.

Laws and regulations have also been significantly modified by decentralization and the enforcement of local powers since 1983. The consequences were significant for the Region, as it became a new fully empowered local authority (the first elections for the Regional Councils occurred in March 1986) and, in theory, received the responsibility for regional town and country planning. This remains theoretical because no decree was proclaimed in order to apply the Article 64 of the Act, March 2, 1982, which defined this regional power.

Finally, the impact of international challenges and trends upon the new regional project and the heightening of the new rivalry between Western metropolises could be all but neglected.

Problems And Challenges Of Regional Planning In 1989

Most of the basic planning options defined by the 1976 Master Plan were reasonable and appropriate and thus the Region enjoyed a rather coherent and organized development. However, a new regional planning challenge in 1989 had to be faced; various problems which could be emphasized include:

The strong need for housing, mainly in the central area, and ways to induce local authorities to develop a dynamic real estate development policy. Financial aids by the Government favour building projects, and they only partly clear up the lack of real estate policy.

The distance between jobs and housing centres have also generated deep public transportation problems related to daily trips, including overcrowding of the ten year old Regional Express Network ('RER') and heavy road traffic congestion. The east-west 'A' line of the RER remains a good example of the problem, even if the east-west regional lack of balance should probably be moderated. Geographical analysis reveals that, in fact, there is a basic lack of balance between the central core and its surroundings; one

half of the regional population and two thirds of regional jobs are nowadays concentrated into the central core, and one million people travel everyday from outside to within the Paris inner ring-road limits. If real, the east-west lack of balance remains bounded with regard to this major imbalance (Figure 2).

The New Regional Project Of October 1989

The new Regional Project of October 1989 was based upon three major points:

- regional guidelines for the central core and the three east-west major axes;
- strategic development poles; and,
- sectoral policies (transportation, communications, housing, environment).

Seven regional guidelines had been considered

- strengthening and economic revitalization of the Central Core: its accessability by road and public transportation should be improved and extended to the whole urban area.
- development of a central axis, 80 km long, from West (Mantes and the Seine river) to East (new town of Marne la Vallee, Euro-Disneyland and Meaux) (Figure 3).
- development of a north axis from Cergy (new town) to Roissy Airport and surrounding areas.
- development of a south axis from Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines (new town) to Massy, Orly airport, and Rungis National Market, this to Evry and Melun Senart new town.
- strengthening both the agricultural and urban framework within the rural area and the greenbelt.
- recovering the banks of the river for leisure and improving the quality of their waters
- continuing the regional project of a greenbelt between the central area and the rural surroundings.

The strategic development poles

- Roissy airport, an international gateway to be interconnected to the TGV (Train Grands Vitesse or Very High Speed Train) station, as a major zone for tertiary activities, hotels and recreational facilities.

- Montesson, northwest of La Defense, along the historical axis from the Louvre through the Place de la Concorde and l'Arc de Triomphe

- Saclay-Palaiseau (45% of the French research and development potential), one way to develop a European-sized technopolis.

- Bercy-Tolbiac southeast pole of Paris, to be extended on the local communities of Charenton and Ivry (project similar in part to the London Docklands).

- the five new towns.

Sectoral policies were also required

Roads and Public Transportation

- should help the growth of the three axes and the strategic development poles;

- the RER, in a second phase, to be interconnected with most of the suburban subway lines (the first phase having been the progressive interconnection of the different RER lines)

- the subway, by extensions of subway lines towards the suburbs, and the building of an express line connecting the development poles (La Defense, Lyon Station, suburban sub-centres, etc); these are now the so-called 'Eole' and 'Meteor' projects

- external networks should support the North and South axes, this being mainly based upon existing infrastructure

- expressway network has to be achieved (2nd ring road, known as 'A 86', and third ring road, the so-called 'La Francilienne') which should connect the new towns and the future strategic development poles (Figure 4).

Environment

- a green network has to be completed, in order to connect the urban green spaces of the central core, the major natural areas of the rural areas around the urban area and the regional green belt.

- the upgrading of the quality of the water and urban waste management

- a better management of the underground resources (protection of rescurces, better control of their extraction and of site redevelopment)

Housing

A policy is needed for which the first objective must be a real increase in housing production: the need is induced by demographic growth and a parallel improvement policy implies a need to build 45,000 to 55,000 flats and houses per year, even as many as 60,000 (half of those being in the central core) in order to solve the local real estate tensions.

The White Paper (February, 1990): Towards A New Master Plan

The new Master Plan aims to organize the regional space around several major urban poles, a diversified transportation network and a green network.

How to revitalize in the central core?

- create a new transportation network and a major circular transportation line, including, in the long term, the development of an underground railway (Figure 5).

- develop three new major urban poles: La Defense-Montesson-Gennevillers (west), Bercy-Tolbiac-Ivry (southeast), and Plaine Saint-Denis (north) (Figure 6).

- reinforce the present urban grid of old and recent poles within the urban area; these new poles, well served by an improved transportation network, will constitute a new polycentric urban grid of the central area (20,000 to 30,000 flats/year), this with a related program of corporate development, public facilities and infrastructure, etc.

- improve the urban framework and the environment ('urban quality', improvement of the river banks, etc.)

How to organize the extension of the urban area?

- optimize the capacities of the five existing new towns, including the study of possible extensions

- reinforce the middle-size cities, located from 30 to 50 km from the centre of Paris

- open two areas close to Paris for urban development: the international pole of Roissy (north) and the technopolis of the Saclay-Palaiseau area, close to the nodal point of Massy (Figure 7).

- achieve the green belt as a counterpart of this polycentric urban organization

The challenge is considerable given such major tasks.

A wide range of strategies and tools are now recommended for adoption by all the partners in Greater Paris regional planning:

- o investment in individual and public transportation
- o incentives for urban densification within the inner urban area
- o revival of a regional real estate policy
- o expansion of professional and university training
- o promotion of a wide range of selected areas for corporate development, in conjunction with the development of a teleport
- o simplification of local regulations and the fiscal system
- o promotion of strategies against pollution and major environmental hazards

In conclusion, the Ile de France Region stands, in a relationship of conflict with the State in order to propose this new regional planning phase of the 1990s. The State will never relinquish the control of its capital region. Yet, the Regional Council has been given—at least theoretically—the responsibility for its regional planning policy. The other local communities ('departments' and 'communes', as they are known) claim to be fully-empowered local partners of the regional planning and development process. The socio-economic operators ask both for more guidelines and less regulation.

And the list could go on. But they all stand as active partners of this transition from a first (and successful) centralized planning policy towards a new decentralized and fully negotiated planning phase. No other conclusion could then be given in October, 1990, as these negotiations are underway.

Figure 1: The Paris Urban Region





POPULATION -DENSITE



EMPLOI / TAUX D'EMPLOI

Figure 2: Axes of Development



Figure 3: General Development Scheme



Figure 4: Ring Roads

Figure 5: Transportation System



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Figure 6: Major Development Poles

Une rocade de transports en commun support d'un grand projet d'aménagement.
- *quel tracé ?*
- *associé à quels centres urbains ?*



1 - La Défense - Gennevilliers - Montesson
2 - Seine-Amont
3 - La Villette - Plaine-Saint-Denis

Une plus grande unité de la zone centrale, trois secteurs stratégiques :
- *quelles priorités ?*
- *quels programmes ?*
- *quels moyens ?*



Figure 7: Regional Poles



5

DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING IN THE RANDSTAD, NETHERLANDS

Gerard Keijzers

I am pleased to have this opportunity to address this important meeting. I was asked to talk to you about socio-economic planning in the Randstad which covers largely the western part of the Netherlands. It includes the well known cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, as well as the Hague and, more in the centre of the country, the city of Utrecht. I was also requested to arrange my introduction in such a way that the politicians and civil servants in the Greater Toronto Area may draw some lesson from it for their planning efforts.

That is certainly not an easy task. It forces me to reflect on the mistakes we, in the Netherlands, made in our planning exercises. And, I think it is only human, to look to the future rather than to dwell on ones mistakes in the past. Nevertheless, I will give it a try. To start off, I will formulate a number of what may have been bigger mistakes. These we made as far back as the 1970s, but they had a determining effect on the stagnation of economic growth and social development until the late 1980s.

But before I come to that—as you can see, it is really very hard for me to return to this awkward period—before I come to that I will give you a few characteristics of my country, the Netherlands.

The Netherlands is a very small country: 200 kilometres long and 150 kilometres wide. It numbers 15 million inhabitants. The Randstad, the only large urban area, with (in total) about 5 million people, covers one-third of the total land area of the Netherlands. Our international relations are intensive. Exports and imports make up 2/3 of our national product. This is not really surprising, since our neighbours Belgium and Germany are only about 150 kilometres away from the heart of the Randstad. Social security is, to western standards, very generous, comparable to the level in Scandinavia. Unemployment is now rapidly declining from an average level of 15% in the 1980s to less than 10%. Slightly more than 1/2 a million people are on unemployment benefits. Most of them, though, are concentrated in the Randstad (I will return to this later). A big problem at the moment is that our social benefit schemes for disabled persons, which has a broad definition of disabledness, covers 1 million people with benefits at the minimum wage level of $800 (US) per month. Also, most of the people here that are drawing from these schemes are in the four main cities of the Randstad. This puts, of course, an enormous burden on these cities.

Because of the relatively small size of the country, the national government has a strong institutional power. The local governments draw most of their monies from the central government and are strongly tied to the national policies set by the government. The local authorities have their own income base of less than 10% of their total income. Between the local governments of the cities and the central government, there is the institutional government layer of the provinces. The Randstad is split into three provinces and counts some 200 local city and town constituencies. As you can imagine, the city governments of the four main cities are screaming for more independence in defining their socio-economic plans.

Now that I have given you this brief outline of the Dutch setting, I would like to explain what I see as the major mistakes we have made in our socio-economic planning in the past.

For too long we have tried to soften the effects of the industrial decline which started in the early 1970s and which was aggravated by the two subsequent oil crises. Instead of adjusting to the new needs of economic development, further internationalisation, and technological development, we tried to keep traditional industries—shipbuilding, textiles, metallurgy, shoe manufacturing, etc.—going with generous subsidy-schemes. Hoping for the best, hoping for recovery. Too little we saw the need for restructuring. Instead of channelling money into education and industrial restructuring, we pout money into shipbuilding of ships which in the end would never sail. Instead of putting money into the upgrading of education levels of the labour force (including the large influx of immigrants from southern Europe and Northern Africa) we put money into unemployment schemes and in schemes to improve the living conditions of immigrants. In fact, as we now know, we tackled structural problems with short term solutions.

Rather than giving you a solution now, I do confront you with a problem: How can one determine whether a socio-economic problem is a structural problem and, hence, when does one apply structural policy instruments? This may be an easy statement, but as you all know, the application of structural policy instruments is difficult. They cut deeply into a society and into the security of those you want to protect.

It took time to realize that far reaching measures were to be taken. It also took time to organize a social consensus to realize this dynamic approach to re-arrange our society. The effects of this slow reaction to the real needs, however, are still very obvious in the four big cities in the Randstad. They suffered most of the economic transition from traditional industries towards a dynamic economic structure based on internationally oriented services and high tech industry.

A second area where we may have made mistakes concerns that of physical planning. In the 1970s in the aftermath of all cultural changes and facilitated by the natural gas wealth, I think that the ethics of labour certainly lost momentum. The

number of leave days per annum increased (civil servants now have 35 per year off; in the private sector about 25). People moved away from the cities to the greener, more agreeable country areas. Official local government policies stimulated them to do so. The idea was that the cities had become too crowded, too congested. Economic activities need to be spread to relieve the cities form their burden. Too late, as we now know, we realized that it was the best educated that left the cities first. With their departure, the cities lost exactly that part of the labour force which was needed most in the economic transition and recovery. The new dynamic modern industries emerged at the outskirts of the Randstad, leaving the major cities with high levels of unemployment of lowly skilled people and a largely outdated industrial structure.

Moreover, we learned, that instead of realizing a balance of economic activity and population spread over the country, we ended up with a large number of commuters. This augmented the problems of traffic congestion in the Randstad. Our public transportation system had great difficulties in coping with the changes in travel behaviour. So most people resorted to private cars and now, we have our daily 50 kilometre traffic jam problem. Since the economic recovery started in 1982 our big cities are growing again.

A third major mistake concerns the late stage at which we realized that the environment needed all our attention. Too late we realized that continuing to produce and consume in the traditional ways would leave us with environmental damages which could only be undone at extremely high costs. Only during the second half of the 1980s did we start to change our attitude and recently established a national environmental policy plan geared towards sustainable growth. If we were to continue to produce in the traditional ways, our soils, water resources and air quality would have deteriorated to an extent that they would become hazardous to our health. Moreover, it would curb the possibilities for production and wealth of the generations after ours. We have now embarked on ambitious schemes to clean up the pollution that we have caused and to establish ways of production and consumption which guarantees the production possibilities of those who come after us. These plans are ambitious and very costly. But we believe a good environment and environmentally sane production processes are invaluable assets for our economy. Here, to come back to my first point, we have decided to go a completely different way; a structural change which cuts deep into our social and economic conditions. The transition is not at all painless. But we are confident we will gain from it in the end.

I will now concentrate on two further issues, topics which are high on the agenda of the city governments in the Randstad and on that of the national government. First, I will tell you some more on the economic plans which are envisaged for the Randstad. After that I will go deeper into our National Environmental Policy Plan and its consequences for economic development in the Randstad.

The Scientific Council for Government Policy recently published a report on problems and prospects for the Randstad. (It has, as yet, not been translated, but for those interested I can give reference to acquire the translation of this important report as soon as it is available.) I will give you a summary of the analysis and recommendations of this report.

The report shows clearly the adverse effects of the economic development of the Randstad. From an international perspective, the situation may not be as adverse; from a national perspective, it is clear that the major cities are coping with a stagnating economic development. An explanation of the situation as it developed is not easy to give. However, it is clear that economic activity was deeply affected by the global restructuring of the economy. Technological changes, the transfer of traditional industries to cheap labour countries, and the rise of new economic centres in Europe (Munich next to Ruhrgebiet, Zurich and Milano next to Paris, and Brussels and Amsterdam) and in the world (west America and Japan), all causes a re-orientation of economic trade which heavily affected traditional industries in the Randstad. These changes took a lot of steam of the Randstad economic engine. This to an extent that it abruptly lost large parts of its economic potential. As I already mentioned, it took time to re-adjust the economy in a structural way. Slowly, and only in the 1980s, we recovered and a new economic structure emerged, based to a large extent on a restructured chemical sector and a rejuvenated and extended international service sector. But we are far from ready yet. If we are to stand a chance in the stiff international competition, we will have to work hard on our comparative advantages. These are definitely in heavy transportation, insurance and financial sectors. Most of them are based in the Randstad. But they need a well equipped physical and telecommunications infrastructure. They also require a well trained labour force.

The concentration of high level educational structures in the Randstad here works in two ways. On the one hand it trains people to the required high level of knowledge of technology and of languages and social behaviour, which is crucial in the multi-lingual and multi-cultural surroundings of Europe. The education base in the Randstad also forms the important trigger for technological development of the modern industrial and service sectors. The local governments in the Randstad have accepted the relative decline of industrial development. They now concentrate on facilitating the development of the international services sectors, while industrial development becomes more widely spread over the whole country. The burden of industrial unemployment will, however, only lessen slowly.

The opening up of the European markets in 1992 is seen as an advantage. We think that, in recent years, our service sectors especially have gained enough strength to meet the international competition. Actually, we will be relieved to find the trade barriers removed. The eccentric location of the Netherlands would form a problem if we

were not able to improve our infrastructure which connects us with the rest of Europe. This concerns not only the development of sufficient road and rail connections, but also the upgrading of the seaport in Rotterdam and the airport of Amsterdam as focal points of our relations with the rest of the world. A great deal of effort is going into this now. We consider this as a prerequisite for the integration into a united economic European market. The unification of Germany will give new impetus to economic development after maybe a few years of adjustment.

The Scientific Council for Government Policy advises to concentrate the efforts along four policy lines to be followed in cooperation between the local and the national governments:

1. Improvement of the infrastructure through strengthening the position of the main sea and airports and through the improvement of the intercity rail connection in the Randstad. The Dutch railnet is to be connected as soon as possible with the European high speed railnet. Public transport facilities are to be improved to relieve the road infrastructure from commuter traffic, and to keep it open for business transport.

2. The educational infrastructure is to be further improved and should be used to facilitate technological development in the Randstad. The relations between the educational sector and the private sector/labour market is to be strengthened.

The educational system is to be utilized to integrate immigrants into the labour market. Immigrants are seen as an asset to economic development, rather than as in the past, objects for social care.

3. The private sector should be facilitated by the local governments in the development of networks for economic development. Close cooperation between local governments and local enterprises is considered essential. Local governments will improve conditions for the establishment of new enterprises within their city boundaries, rather than stimulating a further diffusion of activities beyond the Randstad. The organizational capacities of local governments and enterprises in the cities need to be improved by institutional structures. These should pave the way for: private financing of infrastructural investments, greater involvement in the development and planning of industrial sites, involvement and cooperation in joint education and labour market activities, and in joint private and public efforts to reduce unemployment. The development of new locations is to be improved; especially redundant buildings and industrial sites which are to be rejuvenated at a high rate.

4. The local governments are to be given greater freedom in shaping their socio-economic policies. This implies expansion of the local taxbase at the expense of centralized tax raising. This will give the cities more independence and more of their own responsibilities. It is expected to lead to more competition between cities which will, it is expected, stimulate economic development.

These are the main recommendations brought forward at the Scientific Council for Government Policy. They were received very warmly by the Netherlands government and by the local governments of the four main cities of the Randstad.

They are all aimed at the main objective of putting the Randstad, which covers 1/2 of the Dutch economy, on a competitive edge in the European market and to position the Randstad on a marked, clearly identifiable place in the world economy. The Randstad is to be positioned as the gateway to Europe, with first class connections by sea, air, road and rail to the rest of Europe. I can only wish that we will be able to further organize sufficient social consensus to stick to this path.

Environmental Policies and the Randstad

In the 1980s, there was a growing awareness of the deterioration of the environment. It was apparent that the health of the population became endangered and that we were depleting the environment at the expense of the wealth of future generations. When the World Commission on Environmental and Development (Brundtland Commission) published its report 'Our Common Future', the Government endorsed the analysis of this report and the concept of sustainable development. Social consensus was realised when the Social Economic Council, an important advisory body composed of labour unions and employers' organizations, declared establishment of sustainable growth within one generation, as a higher goal for government policy than the traditional socio-economic objectives. The Council spoke of the supply of environment as an essential factor of production:

'The process by which this supply is maintained is currently receiving too little attention. The reason for this is that natural reproduction costs are reflected inadequately or not at all in the price of products. Future decision making will have to proceed from a framework containing more than just the GNP—measure and environment will have to play a major role.'

The attention to the environment gained momentum when the National Institute for Public Health and Environmental protection published in 1988 its report 'Concern for Tomorrow', which scientifically demonstrates the extent of environmental degradation. This report also showed what needed to be done to return to a path of sustainable development.

The attention to environmental problems increased when Queen Beatrix herself devoted the whole of her Christmas message of 1988 to the environment. From then on, the environment became top priority on the political agenda.

In the summer of 1989, the government published the National Environment Policy Plan, entitled 'To Choose or Lose'. It contained concrete measures on how to

achieve sustainable development. It focused on the long term, the year 2010, but it also included a large number of policy measures for the medium term, until 1994. The financial part of the policy plan caused political turmoil. This led to the fall of the government before the plan could be translated in Parliament. The new government adopted the plan and even published an additional policy plan, including a number of extra measures to intensify policies regarding acidification and the green house effect. Last month, both reports passed Parliament with unanimous votes. Now the government is in business, attempting to translate all the thinking that has been done into actual policy.

The report 'Concern for Tomorrow' led the way, as stated. It showed that if we are to remain within the norm of environmental pollution, then reductions of 70-90% of acidifying emissions (SO2 and NOx) are required. Also, a reduction of the nutrients in percolating water to 10 mg of nitrogen per litre and a substantial reduction in disposal of waste need to be realized. Similarly, a reduction of CO2 emissions at a rate of 2% per annum is to be established. The conclusion was that without changes to the production processes, sustainable development could not be reached.

The recommended structural changes would drasticly reduce energy consumption, maximize use of renewable energy resources, make dramatic changes from private car use to public transport, make a more efficient use of minerals in agriculture, and reduce the use of fertilizers and pesticides and recycling waste. Total annual costs of the measures proposed would rise to over 50 billion guilders in 2010, while net savings on energy and raw materials would amount to 20 billion guilders ($24 billion US) per annum. Net annual cost would amount to 4% of GDP.

In the National Plan for Environmental Policy, the policy measures are centred around the eight so called themes of environment. These include climate change aiming at a reduction of the emissions of CO2 and the complete elimination in short term CFC's. Acidification measures are aimed at realizing a disposition level of 1400 acid equivalents per hectare per year in 2010 with an interim objective of 2400 acid equivalents in the year 2000. The other themes are eutrofication, diffusion of substances, reduction of waste generation, reduction of disturbance of stench, noise, and risks, reduction of area with signs of dehydration and the last theme is called Squandering. The latter implies the establishment in society of the notion that environment is a resource of production. All environmental resources (supplies of raw material, energy, clean water and fertile soil) will have to be charted by the year 2000 and a management strategy will have to be developed to ensure that cycles are closed, energy is used economically, and quality in production and consumption processes is improved.

I needed this long introduction to show you how complicated this problem is and how big the task is to realize the set of goals of the National Environment Policy Plan. The national government has set these goals and organized a target group management, in which local governments play a dominant role in executing and enforcing the plans.

The city government of Rotterdam has a major task in dealing with the petro-chemical industries located in the ports of Rotterdam. The local governments do the consultations and negotiations with the private enterprises in giving permits for emissions in the production process. Local governments are the major actor in the solving of the waste disposal problem and energy conservation schemes. Local and provincial governments are now in the process of developing their own plans for the implementation of environmental policies, based on the national plan.

The turning point in the Dutch way of dealing with the environmental problem may have come from the computations of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which showed that the macro-economic impact of the policies envisaged was only slightly negative. The nature of growth would change, the sectoral patterns would change, but economic growth as such, would not be impeded by the proposed policy measures.

Having defined the goals for environment and having laid out the lines along which would be worked, left the national and the local governments with a tremendous task of implementation. The National Plan included a strategy for implementation and the so called target group strategy. Seven target groups were defined and institutional structures established to be able to consult and negotiate on plan implementation. Separate bodies are established to have possibilities for actual negotiation. These target groups are agriculture, traffic and transport, industry, the energy sector, the building trade, and drinking water and waste disposal firms. Separate negotiations are done with consumer organizations.

To give you an idea of how this strategy works and how the negotiations with the target groups go, I will explain here the dealings with the energy sector.

The energy sector has to survive after a further reduction in pollution (especially of acidifying emissions) as well as energy conservation. Important objectives to be realized are:

- Electric power plants have to achieve 85% reduction in their sulfurdioxide emissions by 2000. Reduction of nitrogen oxides is to be more than 50%. The national government, together with local governments, negotiates with the energy sector on investment paths to realize these reductions. Recently, a covenant was drawn up to establish the set goals. Local governments give licensees for electricity production and enforce the execution of the plans by the energy sector.

- The energy distribution companies (controlled by local governments) will contribute to energy conservation policies. The local governments are at the heart of devising such schemes, implemented by their distribution firms.

- The energy sector established systems of internal environmental concern; this is also closely controlled by local governments.

- The energy sector, especially the distribution firms, controlled by local governments, stimulate energy conservation and the use of renewable energy sources.

So this is the example of the strategy of implementing environmental policies for the energy sector. It would take too much time to show you how we plan our other target group strategies. But it will not take much of your imagination to realize how enormous this task is.

The process, however, has started and puts high demands on all enterprises and on the local authorities. The Association of Provincial Authorities, the Union of Netherlands Municipalities and the Association of Water Control Boards are all closely involved in all consultations and negotiations, given their role as licensing and enforcement bodies. Their role is crucial in the establishment of what is called sustainable development.

In conclusion, the Netherlands is working hard on establishing its place in the European economy. Economic planning and environmental planning go hand in hand. Of course, there are tensions between the goals. For example, the envisaged increased activities at our national airport do conflict with the environmental goals of reduction of acidifying substances and reduction of noise disturbance. These conflicts must be set at, for all, acceptable levels. Of course we are in the process of planning our economic and environmental development. But rather than planning, we now talk of guiding the society towards the set goals. No longer afraid to implement structural changes.

Figure: The Randstad Region

The Netherlands Les Pays-Bas



The Randstad Holland La Randstad Hollande

6

STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA

J. Brian McLoughlin

The Postwar Development of Melbourne

Melbourne is Australia's second city (after Sydney) and is the capital of the State of Victoria. It is the most southerly large town on the mainland and lies some 600 miles south-west of Sydney and 500 miles south-east of Adelaide (see Figure 1). The present (1990) metropolitan population has recently passed 3 million persons and the area of the metropolis is about 2,100 square miles (5,240 sq. kms). Like most of the Australia State capitals, Melbourne dominates its state to a remarkable degree, having around 70% of the population of Victoria, but far higher proportions of the State's manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing jobs and overwhelmingly high proportions of the jobs in finance, professional services, research-and-development, higher education and all forms of government employment. It follows that most of the crucial social, economic, environmental and political issues in the State are in fact Melbourne issues. This extraordinary centrality of the metropolis helps explain the dominance of the area in terms of the administrative and political energies which have always been expended on it during the whole of the post-war period.

At the end of the second world war, Melbourne had a population of about 1.25 million and a reasonably diversified economic base, retaining its historic position as the largest port in the country, having been a major service and administrative centre. Indeed, by far the greater proportion of Australia's corporate headquarters were located in Melbourne which in some ways reflects its role as the capital of the Commonwealth of Australia until the federal administration was moved to Canberra in 1927.

By the mid-1950s, the society and economy of the country had converted to peace-time mode and Melbourne began to play a leading role in the shift of Australia from a primary-exporter role into a manufacturing-industrial society, driven largely by government policies and directed at self-sufficiency and modernity, building an industrial capacity for replacing imports behind the protection of tariff walls.

The industrialization of Australia was concentrated first in Melbourne and Sydney and to a much smaller degree in Adelaide. The growth was driven by mixtures of public capital borrowings and direct investment by British and US firms especially in the automobile and consumer-goods industries. But so successful was the whole project

of industrialization that a huge workforce had to be imported, not only from the traditional source of Britain but much more from southern and eastern Europe.

Industrialization and immigration increased the dominance of the largest cities (see Figure 2) and led in turn to suburban growth that was rapid and remorseless. The burgeoning suburbs were at first residence-led, but as the 1960s boom drew on, the new large factories led the suburbanising charge to be followed by wholesaling, retailing, entertainment and yet more low-density housing in the preferred Australian form of the 'quarter-acre block'. Melbourne thus became a metropolitan area consisting of the historic core of the CBD and an extensive suburban sprawl that extended 10, 20 and even 30 miles out—a form much more typical of North America than of its European heritage.

From the mid-1970s on, Melbourne has experienced far more turbulent conditions in common with a great many cities in the advanced capitalist societies. The political trauma of the sacking of the Federal Labour Government of Gough Whitlam in 1975 can be seen as a dramatic punctuation associated with the very different circumstances following the OPEC oil-price rises. Australia's economy, never mature and self-sufficient, despite the illusions of wealth from mineral exports, has been exposed to the full rigors of re-structuring of the world economy through the agency of the big trans-national corporations. Manufacturing investment and employment has been severely reduced so that immigration, the main engine of metropolitan growth, has almost ceased. At the same time, the floating of the Australian dollar and the deregulation of the financial sector has made the country a very attractive location for US, Asian and Japanese capital seeking relatively cheap and secure locations for a variety of real-estate investment, typically in CBD offices, up-market residential and retirement developments and the whole plethora of leisure and recreation complexes. But such developments do not create much real wealth, as profits are typically remitted to the offshore origins of the capital or recycled into the global circuit; furthermore they have a powerful tendency to boom-and-bust waves with damaging effects on the local economy and on the public purse which is often called upon to subsidize them.

Melbourne's experience is typical of most large Australian cities where the political pressures to generate 'growth' in almost any form—and especially visible signs and symbols such as 'cranes on the skyline'—has always been exacerbated by a Federal structure which enables investors to play off one State and capital city against all others in a form of Dutch auction. As in most States, the Victorian government has been under such competitive developmental pressures as to force it into watering down, side-tracking, 'fast-tracking' or even over-riding its own planning controls and the wishes of local communities. These tactics have especially been associated in the 1980s with very large proposals for Melbourne CBD office and office—and retail—complexes, with a residential-and-marina development on the Port Phillip waterfront, with major new suburban retail-and -office park proposals, and latterly with the development of the 19th-century docklands which were to have been the site of an 'Olympic Village' to house the athletes, later to be sold off as prime residential real estate.

These secular long-term trends in urban growth have had the effect of setting in motion roller-coaster booms and busts in residential real estate. One particular phenomenon has been the steady gentrification of the inner suburbs beginning in the early 1960s and continuing to the present with no signs of abatement. An uncomfortable outcome has been to force a growing number of middle-to-lower-income families further and further out of town to the only places where they can find a block of land and a house they can afford. But the 'fiscal crisis of the state' has meant that such outermost new suburban developments are often seriously lacking in even the most basic and public facilities—sewers, water mains, sealed roads, child care, schools, health care, public transport.

That old spectre of the 1960s—multiple deprivation—once unknown in the 'Lucky Country', now haunts the sprawling outer suburbs of Melbourne and the other large cities of Australia. Government in the 1960s generally had the money, if not always the imagination, to try to deal with these problems, most of which were concentrated in the old core around the city centre where they could be neatly circumscribed by the electoral and bureaucratic boundaries. But in Australia now, this problem is widespread over hundreds of square miles, even if the political and official imagination were present, there is little if any money to deal with it.

Such then, however brief and inadequate, is a sketch of the post-war development of Melbourne. It is now time to turn to an equally brief overview of the governmental structures and the place of various town planning processes within them.

Planning In Metropolitan Melbourne

Like Canada, Australia is a federal polity. The Commonwealth Government has very few powers over urban development directly, although it has indirect influence through the Commonwealth/States fiscal system in general and the funding of the (very small) public housing sector in particular. The federal government's greatest influence on urban structure is its considerable holdings of land for a wide variety of federal purposes—especially government offices in and around the CBD and very large suburban and 'ex-urban' military landholdings. But, that said, the major town planning powers in Australia are possessed by the States over 'strategic' planning, and powers delegated by them to the control of development day-to-day. It is not possible to generalise to any degree for the whole of Australia because of detailed variation between the States, but at a very broad level the picture is universal; the following notes relate to the State of Victoria and within it to the Melbourne metropolitan area.

Although there had been a Metropolitan Planning Scheme prepared in the 1920s, this turned out to be a one-off exercise aborted by the Depression in the thirties, and it was not until 1944 that town planning legislation was introduced in Victoria and even

then the powers were permissive rather than mandatory. But in 1949, a somewhat reluctant Victorian State government, goaded by a federal (Labor) threat to withhold housing funds, introduced the first comprehensive Town and Country Planning Act in 1949.

This provided for the control of development in every part of the State and, in the case of the metropolitan area, vested the powers of both plan-making and control in the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works (MMBW), the major sewers, water, main roads and parks authority dating from 1890 and modelled on the London MBW. It will be clear from what has been said already (about the dominance of the metropolis) that the creation of a directly-elected metropolitan authority was a political impossibility as it would, then as now, threaten the hegemony of the State itself. And so it came about that the MMBW was given the strategic planning responsibility whilst day-to-day controls were delegated to the 34 Municipalities which then compromised the jurisdiction of the MMBW. The MMBW is an indirectly-elected body having (at that time) one representative from each of the municipalities.

The first post-war Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme (MMPS) was prepared by a small task force within the MMBW, starting in 1951 and completing its job in 1954, whereupon the team was disbanded and returned to other duties or jobs. This is highly significant for it indicates that the MMBW, the State government and possibly others (but *not* the team itself), saw the task as essentially a one-off exercise to produce an end-state plan. The legislation did not specifically provide for any continuity, monitoring or accountable review process at regular intervals (as for instance the British had done in their monumental 1947 Act). Not only was the MMPS seen as a one-off job, it was further characterized by being based on precise zoning, derived from US practise specifically, whereby the Scheme Maps are coupled operationally to a Scheme Ordinance which specifies with great precision what can (with or without condition) and can not be allowed within each defined zone.

All of this has led to a number of problematic outcomes as time, socioeconomic change and urban development has unfolded over the past four-and-a-half decades. First, in the absence of any overall review mechanism, the Scheme has been subjected to endless pressures for revision—typically as applications for re-zoning. These, when permitted, have the legal status of formal Amendments to the MMPS but they may range in significance from allowing a suburban light industrial site to be re-developed for housing (such minor changes forming the vast majority), by way of permitting a considerable enlargement to an out-of-town shopping complex through to occasional total recasting of the 'philosophy' and direction of the MMPS as a whole (as for example happened in 1968, 1971, 1983, 1987 and possibly in 1990). All of these changes to the MMPS, be they trivial, significant or strategically-important, have *the same legal status*; none of them is the subject of any consistent and publicly-accountable reasoning.

The one-off status of the MMPS in 1954 and the lack of provision for regular and systematic reviews, has meant that the strategy gap has been filled on several occasions

by documentation of major changes which have no legal status and no requirement for 'reasoned justification' (to use a British planning term). Whilst the very large changes of direction in 1971 and 1983 were presented as formal Amendments, those of 1987 and 1990 which are of comparable importance have not. So, whilst there was public access to a debate about the merits of the 'corridors and wedges' strategy of the early 1970s there was no public debate about the major policy shift towards 'District Centres' and 'urban consolidation' in 1983, nor to the revived corridor strategy and 'densification' of 1987 and onwards.

Finally, the lack of any legislative basis for regular review and updating of the MMPS in an accountable fashion has met a distinct lack of research-and-intelligence capability about how the metropolis is actually 'working' at all times. Thus there is little scope for informal debate about this area of public policy. Major changes of direction have always tended to take the form of surprised bush-fire exercises after the event. There has been no significant development of in-house research on a continuing basis and a consequently heavy reliance on spasmodic and discontinuous academic and consultancy studies.

The Evolution of Planning Powers and Agencies

For almost all of the post-war period, the MMBW was the central actor in metropolitan planning. The 1949 Act also provided for a Town and Country Planning Board (TCPB) to oversee the preparation of Schemes in the whole of the State and to advise government generally about their approval. It turned out to be a small but competent quango (round about twenty staff most of the time) which Ministers generally found a helpful and quickly-responsive informal sounding board. It had almost no formal power and in 1977 it was merged with the new Planning Ministry which had been created in 1973. But the key metropolitan powers remained with the MMBW until 1985 when the town planning staff of the Board (about 300 out of 2,000) was merged with the now much larger (700) Ministry of Planning and Environment (MPE)—a cabinet portfolio. The 1970s and early 1980s can thus be seen as a period of considerable bureaucratic and political complexity as several agencies jockeyed for position over the issues of metropolitan planning. At the centre were the MMBW, the TCPB and the new Ministry, whilst in the day-to-day firing line were the 54 municipalities which the 1971 extension of the MMBW jurisdiction now comprised (see Figure 3). In the CBD, matters were even more complex since a major actor was the central city authority—the largest in the area—the Melbourne City Council. By 1985 the situation had been much simplified by the consolidation of all the most significant town planning powers at the centre—in the MPE. The Melbourne City Council was shorn of all its powers—i.e., sacked—in 1980 and, on its restoration in 1983, was given only minor town planning powers.

But this is, of course, only part of the picture; we must also note the evolution of powers over economic, social and spatial change which lie alongside those formally

labelled 'planning'. In the early post-war years, economic agencies were few and, especially as the long boom set in, not strongly called for as it seemed that the apparently endless growth would look after itself. But after the recession bit and increased its hold on the late 1970s and through 1980s, Victoria has put in place more and more significant and central economic agencies such as the Department of Industry Economy and Resources and the very powerful Departments of Management and Budget and the Premier's Department. These typically 1980s central bureaucracies have the potential to influence major decision about the directions and locations of strategic change but their links with the central Planning Ministry have been weak. One has the impression that in the political and administrative pecking order, the Planning Ministry is a poor cousin and its abilities to frame advice and influence the debates on metropolitan growth not very significant, despite its having a seat on the Cabinet Committee.

Throughout the period, there have been several other State agencies and quangos—a Victorian predisposition—which have had influence on the shaping of metropolitan Melbourne. These include the Housing Ministry (once a notoriously independent and intensive body as the Housing Commission of Victoria), the State Electricity Commission (still largely a law unto itself), the variously-named Metropolitan Tramways Board and the Victorian State Railways—now combined as the Metropolitan Transit Authority in the metropolitan region—which run commuter services on train, bus and tram and, last but by no means least, the various divisions of the MMBW left behind by the departing town planners in 1985, responsible for major parks and open spaces, major roads and—or great importance—main sewerage, drainage and water supply. The influence of these various bodies on the developmental track of Melbourne has been very great, as recent research is showing. Their links with the officially-designated town planning body—at one time the Town Planning Division of the MMBW, latterly the MPE—have often been tenuous and unclear, always subject to the territoriality and professional divisiveness associated with all bureaucracies and especially those not accountable to the democratic process.

Finally, mention must be made of one more significant public agency with a role to play—the Urban Land Authority (ULA). The ULA was set up in 1973 in response to the strongly-reformist Federal Labor government's call for a much firmer public role in the acquisition, assembly and disposal of land required to provide for orderly urban growth, and especially to counteract the corruption and speculation which had so reduced public confidence in government in the 1960s and early 1970s. As the years have gone by, the ULA's role has evolved partly in response to the dominant political views of the times and partly due to its own corporate philosophy. At the beginning of the 1990s, the ULA is a slim and effective actor in the urban real-estate play, acquiring land by negotiation or compulsorily at market prices and selling it on to developers under conditions which effectively rule out speculative profiteering. But the portion of all land likely to be needed for development which passes through the hands of the ULA is small—about 10% at any time, but tending to rise—and its total influence, though benign, is modest.

By far and away, the biggest actors in the shaping of Melbourne's growth are in the private sector—multinational finance and development companies, Australian large and medium-sized industries, residential developers and land-holding speculators, 'volume' and smaller housebuilders, the ever-more integrated retail and leisure sectors.

We should also recall that the greatest daily shaping of any city in a market society is done by ordinary households buying, selling, remodelling and relocating—subject of course to the constraints of money and local regulation including town planning. A considerable proportion of the 'implementation' of any planning scheme is in fact carried out (or subverted) by the ordinary household.

Strategies for Shaping Melbourne's Growth

It is useful to identify a number of periods in the history of post-war Melbourne each of which has been associated with a particular metropolitan planning strategy. These are strikingly distinct in their style and punctuated by very sharp turning points both in the socioeconomic backcloth and in the content of the metropolitan strategy adopted. The major turning points occur at around 1954, 1971, 1983 and 1987; it is too soon to say whether we have just seen another shift in 1990 or if that is just a fine tuning of 1987.

The Strategy of 1954

The 1954 MMPS has been called a cautious trend plan and indeed it did not seek to redirect the expected growth (up to 1969) of the area in any significant way. Instead it set out land allocations which continued Melbourne's long-established trend of growth predominantly to the south and east. It also confirmed long-held reservations of open land along the main creek valleys in order to manage storm water flows and to provide—along with major metropolitan parks—large-scale recreational areas. Again following trends, most new industrial zonings were made to the north and west of the centre (see Figure 4). The research base for the 1954 Scheme was sophisticated for its time and its authors stressed the need for regular monitoring of change by a small team retained for that purpose. But this was not to be, nor was the Scheme to have an easy passage to public acceptance—it was not formally approved until 1968, virtually the plan's horizon year.

But long before that date it had become very clear that economic and population growth, driving rapid suburbanisation, had totally outstripped the modest land allocations of 1954; a totally new Scheme was needed and the complex administration of the State Government, TCPB and MMBW set to work in 1968 on a major task that was to occupy their energies for three years.

The 1971 Amendments

In 1971 the Government was finally able to publish for comments its new strategy for shaping the rampant growth of Melbourne. After much professional and political debate this turned out to be based on the bold concept of some six 'corridors' of suburban growth separated by green 'wedges' of open space—parks and play areas closer in, farmland and forest further out (see Figure 5). The much larger allocations of land—requiring a considerable extension of the MMBW planning jurisdiction—were predictable and sensible in light of the boom experience. However, two main factors served to undermine the new strategy—land speculation and the need to take account of the zoning of the municipalities now brought within the MMBW area. The first led to yet another escalation in house and land prices and some well-publicised 'scandals'; the second to a great degree of administrative complexity as the authorities strove to make some common cause about zoning definitions and meanings.

But no sooner had the 1971 version of MMPS been set in place than, once again, Melbourne's planners fell victims to the flow of wider events. In 1972, Australians elected a Federal Labor Government which took an unusually interventionist position in urban and regional policies but quickly fell foul of established interests—in the federal bureaucracy as much as in business. The Labor administration was sacked by the Governor-General in November 1975, but by that time the first effects of the OPEC oil-price hike were already being felt in a very exposed economy.

National, regional and metropolitan growth slowed quickly and immigration dropped to a trickle. But whilst the overall population growth of Melbourne was much reduced, the area continued to decentralize as household sizes fell, real incomes rose, and inner-suburban house prices began their dramatic rises as the 1970s gentrification moved into top gear. One effect of all this was to push suburbanisation just as fast as the boom of the 1960s, but in more chaotic and unpredictable ways as both new and established high-status suburbs fought to retain their position and developers moved ever further afield to provide cheaper housing for those displaced in the complex remodelling of the social and economic geography of Melbourne.

The planners—both of land use and transport—who had boldly allocated much more land and freeways now found themselves faced with a much tenser set of complex community activisms, resisting growth, defending their old turfs and stopping freeway builders in their tracks. But their biggest fears, which arose as the 1970s wore on, concerned the possibility of the slow death of inner Melbourne suburbs and the CBD due to economic restructuring, decentralising of many activities and real declines in population. Leading figures returned from trips to Britain and the US and told of their fears of a 'doughnut city'—but with little or no research into the actual local situation.

And so it came about at the end of the troubled 1970s that the issues of urban consolidation and 'Densification' moved high up on the public agenda and led to the formulation of a third version of the MMPS.

The 1983 Strategy

The incoming Labor State government in 1982 was committed to a high profile on metropolitan planning within overall State policies. In 1983 it introduced a major Amendment of the MMPS which highlighted the need to consolidate the existing urban fabric by reducing suburban sprawl, encouraging higher residential densities and identifying some 15 suburban commercial nodes for concentration 'District Centre' development; the main reason put forward was the need to make better use of existing infrastructure, to provide for greater variety in dwelling types, and above all to maintain and enhance the status of the CBD.

These policies have generally failed—commercial developments have proliferated widely in suburbia, there has been considerable community opposition to the move towards higher densities and unusual dwelling-types, the CBD continues to have falling shares of retail and other activities whilst passing through another spectacular building boom in 1987-9 which has been followed by the predictable bust.

1987: "Shaping Melbourne's Future"

The last Victorian Government statement is too recent to evaluate. Curiously it revives the 'corridors' of 1971 but now they seem to be less precisely bounded; district and higher residential density policies are restated but with far less conviction; the main theme is to control suburban sprawl and to coordinate public-service provisions in the mainly working class outer suburban area (where the voters have given both State and Federal Governments rude shocks in the last 18 months).

By way of very brief summary, this long and complex story has some general and enduring characteristics. First, metropolitan policy of *implementation* has been carried out within the matrix of a highly detailed zoning Scheme and Ordinance. Second, the *development and articulation* of strategic policies has been done by a series of one-off, stand-alone exercises with *no clear legal basis* nor operational power (save that of the MMPS). Finally, there has been no continuing and developing *research base* in the public service either to found these strategies or to monitor their implementation and outcomes.

Tools for Strategy Implementation

Melbourne's strategic planners have used a number of tools directed at the implementation of plans for metropolitan growth and the mix of these means has varied over time. In the long boom of the 1960s and early 1970s, few tools were needed other than the development-control of MMPS, but a good deal of negotiation occurred with major industrial developers in order to help them with site assembly, infrastructure and

workers' housing. But very often these actions were not so much directed at implementing a firm strategy as facilitating 'growth' and amending the MMPS where necessary. Moreover, a good deal of the actual physical development of the region was brought about by major road construction, infrastructure and housing developments in the public sector—the Road Construction Authority, the Housing Commission and of course the MMBW.

During the more turbulent and uncertain period from the mid-1970s on, direct public investment has dropped a lot, except of course for main sewers and water reticulation. The 'implementation' of metropolitan growth has come to depend more and more on the building of complex relationships with the private sector. Thus for example, negotiations have occurred with the highly-centralized retail sector over the development of suburban shopping and office complexes, often in an attempt to persuade them of the attractions of 'District Centres', with the increasingly multinational giants of property and finance over the size and locations of 'mega-projects' and with major housing interest over the need for a wider variety of dwellings and site layouts. The later part of the 1980s have seen Melbourne (and the State of Victoria) striving to attract and promote development by all the now-familiar means of 'urban boosterism'—waterfronts, docklands, leisure complexes, tourism and, of course, the Olympic Games.

But we should not forget the enormous influence on shaping metropolitan growth exerted by the pattern of infrastructure provision—the main sewers and water supply grid put in by the MMBW and the freeways constructed by the highly autonomous construction authorities. One would imagine that, since the sewer- and-water powers were for a long time carried out alongside the strategic town planning powers in the MMBW, there would have been almost total consistency between the planning of the infrastructure and suburbanisation patterns in general. But alas, for whatever reasons of professional territories or communication failures, this has seldom been the case; the final irony is that the 1985 transfer of the MMBW town planners to the new and enlarged Ministry made such coordinated implementation even more difficult. Major road construction and planning has always been divorced from landuse planning.

The one consistent and enduring tool for implementation of plans has been, and continues to be, the 'negative' power of development control. For example, a very widely-used tool for the restraint of development on the fringe of the metropolis has been the use of minimum lot-size zoning. This familiar and world-wide experience has been reinforced in Melbourne by the absence of any legally-prescribed and accountable strategy framework and the continued reliance on a zoning-based Scheme for all levels of urban planning. Moreover, the tool found so effective by many other free-market societies—some form of public acquisition and disposal of development land—has so far had only limited application here.

Have a Clear Legally-based System for Strategic Plans

There are many advantages—technical, political, administrative and demographic—in locating the strategic planning system in a clearly specified and widely understood legal framework which identifies the rights and the responsibilities of all the main actors in the strategic planning business.

Build into this the Need for Regular Review

In market societies there are close limits on the powers of government to direct when and where development should occur; but what a democracy *does* need is a well-informed debate on what has happened, what is happening at this moment, what is likely to happen and how the future public policies and controls might modify things; the legal requirement for periodic (e.g., 5 yearly) review provides a clear basis for this.

Have a very clear allocation of Responsibilities

Strategic planning has always been plagued by political and bureaucratic infighting because of its very wide ambit and its political salience. The problem may thus never be finally 'solved' but very clear specifications of staff and line responsibilities are a great help and should preferably be built into the law (as above). In particular, it is important to be agreed on 'vertical' (e.g., local *vs* State/Provincial) divisions of responsibility and 'horizontal' sectors (e.g., economic issues, housing, transport, infrastructure, utilities, conservation, etc.). It is particularly important to insure that local governments have a major *and continuing* role to play in metropolitan strategies especially in using day-to-day development control activity and public participation as elements of monitoring the strategy's progress. On the horizontal axis, it seems sensible to have seconded personnel from other sectors as members of the metropolitan strategy team.

Have some form of Public Tenure of Development land

The greatest single influence on the growth patterns of cities is the ownership of development rights in land and all the evidence that some of public ownership, (even temporary) is a highly effective (and possibly 'profitable') means of directing urban growth.

Set up a Research-Information-Monitoring System

This cannot be too strongly emphasised. In a free-market society, with limited possibilities to socialise development rights, the most influential democratic and administrative tool is that of accurate and up-to-date information on the way the metropolis is actually developing, at what speeds, for which purposes and why—and of course, where it is likely to be heading in the foreseeable future and what, if anything, can be done to influence this track. This is simply *a learning model* whereby the whole community gradually becomes better and better informed and empowered to engage in

democratic debate. As mentioned already, local government activities and views are vital in contributing to and receiving from the strategic monitoring operation.

All of these suggestions require no more than quite ordinary political imagination and administrative skill to bring about; moreover they need not cost an extra cent of public money. Melbourne has not done particularly well in any of these areas, partly because it has not listened carefully and selectively enough to the lessons of other comparable societies. It is therefore very heartening to see the Office of the Greater Toronto Area, through the auspices of Canadian Urban Institute, take this bold initiative and it is great honour to have been asked to contribute.

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Figure 1: States, Territories and Capital Cities

Figure 2: Metropolitan Dominance in Australia

Distribution of Population between Metropolitan, Other Urban and Rural Areas, 1971

State or Territory	Year	Percentage of total population in Metropolitan	Other	Rural Urban
New South Wales	1947	55.3	27.2	17.5
	1954	54.5	28.3	17.2
	1961	55.9	29.5	14.6
	1966	57.9	28.7	13.4
	1971	59.3	29.4	11.3
Victoria	1947	63.0	18.2	18.8
	1954	62.4	19.2	18.4
	1961	65.4	19.6	15.0
	1966	65.6	20.0	14.4
	1971	68.4	19.4	12.2
Queensland	1947	36.4	34.4	29.2
	1954	38.2	35.0	26.8
	1961	41.0	35.4	23.6
	1966	43.2	33.6	23.2
	1971	44.9	34.6	20.5
Western Australia	1947	54.6	16.7	28.7
	1954	54.7	16.5	28.8
	1961	57.3	17.1	25.6
	1966	60.0	16.8	23.2
	1971	62.4	19.2	18.4
South Australia	1947	59.4	13.7	26.9
	1954	60.8	13.9	25.3
	1961	60.9	18.3	20.8
	1966	66.8	15.9	17.3
	1971	69.1	15.6	15.3
Tasmania	1947	30.3	33.5	36.2
	1954	30.9	35.1	34.0
	1961	33.2	37.4	29.4
	1966	32.2	38.2	29.6
	1971	33.3	40.2	26.5
ACT	1947	89.7	—	10.3
	1954	93.3	—	6.7
	1961	95.9	—	4.1
	1966	96.1	—	3.9
	1971	98.0	—	2.0
Northern Territory	1947	—	66.0	34.0
	1954	—	66.8	33.2
	1961	—	63.2	36.8
	1966	—	77.4	22.6
	1971	—	64.7	35.3
Australia: total	1947	50.7	18.1	31.1
	1954	54.1	24.9	21.1
	1961	56.3	25.9	17.9
	1966	58.2	25.1	16.6
	1971	60.1	25.5	14.7

Note: 1971 figures include full-blood Aboriginals (not included in other Census figures).

Sources: *Report of the Committee of Economic Enquiry* (Vernon Report) Vol. II: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics: *Censuses of the Commonwealth of Australia*, 1954, 1961, 1966 and 1971.

Figure 3: Metropolitan Region Municipalities

Figure 4: Melbourne Metropolitan Planning Scheme, 1954



Figure 5: 'Corridors and Wedges', 1971



7

MANAGING URBAN GROWTH IN CITY REGIONS OF GERMANY

Klaus R. Kunzmann

Introduction: The Limits of Comparative Studies

Lessons from other places provide, as a rule, an extremely stimulating exercise for preparing decision-making processes in urban development issues. Being a search for appropriate solutions for perceived urban problems they are, indeed, a quite useful means. Not because solutions of problems can be easily transferred from one place to another—in most cases this turns out to be a rather disappointing exercise—but because they sharpen the view on cause-effect relationships. Anything else is just raising false hopes.

The socio-cultural and politico-economic context of urban policy is such a complex subject matter that it renders any systematic comparison difficult, if not impossible. Traditions differ resulting in different value systems and attitudes, as do administrative structures and procedures. Usually, language differences are underrated. The best translation may not be correct because the usage of words is determined by the knowledge of concepts underlying such words. 'Urban renewal' in Canada, for example, most likely differs from 'Stadterneuerung' in Germany, although, at a first glance, it describes more or less the same efforts and process to renew the city. Even the word 'planning' may, in the end, have a different meaning in two different countries, despite a daily increasing internationalisation of theories and concepts.

It may have a negative (socialist/state interventionist) connotation for regional economists, but it has a positive one for business managers or transport planners, who just want to see the process from problem analysis to implementation properly planned. For physical (land use) planners in turn, planning is often just the design of a two or three dimensional plan showing the existing and planned distribution of future land uses in a city or an urban district. The main lesson that one can draw from other places is the need to go deeper into the analysis of causes for the problems one has to solve, and into the selection of parameters one really has or wants to change, for solving the problem.

However there is still another no less important effect. It is the visible, positive, exemplary character lessons from other places can give to public opinion leaders and political decision- makers. They can tell that a certain project, an approach or strategy has turned out to be feasible, enforceable and implementable in another context, i.e. that it works and does not remain a visionary project, a daydream or 'castle in the air'. In this

paper, I will describe how, by which policies and means, and by whom, urban growth in Germany is managed and controlled. Frankfurt and the Ruhrgbiet are taken as two case studies for illustrating a land- related aspect of present urban policies in Germany. I will draw some general conclusions from the arguments presented in this paper which may be worth considering at another place in another context.

Urban Germany 1990: Some Facts and Figures

For historical and political reasons the spatial structure of the Federal Republic of Germany is characterised by a very balanced urban system. In principal, there are five types of city-regions in the country.

First, there is Frankfurt, the exploding metropolis on the way to becoming a global city. However, since reunification of the two Germanies, its rank is now challenged by the old and the new capital Berlin.

Second, there are the economically successful city regions of Munich and Stuttgart and Duesseldorf.

Third, there are more traditional early industrialized city regions like Hamburg, Bremen and Cologne of the polycentric city region of the Ruhrgebiet which have been affected harder or earlier than others by the economic, social and spatial impacts of structural change and urban decline.

Fourth, there is a considerable number of medium-sized city regions all over Germany which play a significant functional role in their respective regional contexts.

Fifth, since October 3, 1990 there are the cities of eastern Germany with their rotten infrastructure, their low standard housing stocks and their obsolete industries.

These five different city regions in Germany are confronted with quite different urban development problems:

Although Frankfurt's land market has not yet reached the level of Paris, London or Tokyo, affordable urban land has become a scare resource in the city region. Consequently, almost monthly, new high-rise buildings are added to the skyline of the new inner-city and suburban rings to suburbia, converting more and more of the neighbouring small and medium-sized cities to dependant suburbs.

Also, other equally successful cities, such as Munich or Stuttgart continue to grow far beyond their narrow administrative boundaries. Like Frankfurt, these city regions suffer seriously from growing urban diseconomies, from traffic congestion, waste disposal constraints and from environmental pollution, from rising land values and from the related social and economic impacts (housing shortage, urban poverty, etc.).

Other, earlier industrialized city regions in turn, hit hard during the late 1970s and early 1980s by the last wave of technological and structural economic change, are trying to cope with the various social and economic impacts of urban decline. Favoured by an advantageous macro-economic climate many of these cities have successfully transformed and diversified essential parts of their local economic base.

Many of the small- and medium-sized cities in Germany, primarily those in the South, (e.g., Regensburg, Augsburg, or Landshut) seem to have been profiting from the considerable overspill effects of the larger urban agglomerations. In recent years they have become a favourite target of national and international investments in industrial and service sectors, and residences of the mobile, highly skilled labour force which is continuously driven out of their centrally located urban districts of the core city.

The cities and city regions of the new eastern provinces of Germany have added a new dimension to local and federal urban policies. To modernize the economic base, to regenerate the heavily polluted environment and the obsolete physical infrastructure, considerable costly efforts will have to be undertaken to establish functioning local governments with efficient urban management capabilities.

Frankfurt: The Future Global City?

When (after the second world war) Berlin, the capital city of the German Reich, lost this function and Bonn became the new capital of West-Germany, Frankfurt's second renaissance commenced. Benefitting from the decision to move the headquarters of the new Bundesbank to Frankfurt, the former role of the city as a European banking centre was soon re-established.

Today, with more than 500 banks being represented in the city, Frankfurt is one of the most important banking places in the world. This and the fact that Frankfurt is, after London and Paris, the third most important (and crowded) European airport, brought the city into the upper league of Euro-cities with good chances to soon join the club of global cities. Due to recent political changes in Europe, such hope is now being dumped by the new (and old) contender Berlin; although the new capital of Germany most likely will not be selected as the location for the headquarters of the future National European Bank.

Its continually growing economic importance in post-war Germany has changed very much the city's physical appearance. Despite some efforts in the early 1970s to stop the emerging inner-city urban renewal process, Frankfurt had become the only German city with an American-type skyline, and its image-campaign consultants created the nick-name Mainhattan, by using the name of the city's river to create a catchy word.

Obviously, the city's success has considerably affected its local land market. In 1990, the office rents in the city were by far the highest in Germany, exceeding 55 DM/sqm. The inner-city boom has forced households and small firms to leave the inner-city, or even Frankfurt, to either one of the neighbouring cities (Offenbach, Hanau, Wiesbaden or Darmstadt), or the many suburban and rural settlements in the larger region Rhein-Main.

While the population of Frankfurt has declined form 708,000 in 1970 to 592,000 in 1986 and grown to 618,266 in 1988, the population of the city region (the area of the Umlandverband Frankfurt) has remained constant during the same period at a level of 1.4 million. The population of the whole urban region (Rhein-Main) has continuously grown to 3,319,000 in 1988.

In 1987, 76.4% of the city's 558,852 employees were in the service sector (53,174 in banking and 77,943 in transport and communication). Nevertheless, automotive and chemical industries still play a significant role in the larger agglomeration. Hoechst and General Motors (Opel) have large production plants in the region.

The greater urban region is a multi-functional and polycentric urban agglomeration with a large hinterland reaching into Heidelberg and Mannheim in the south, to Koblenz and Bonn in the north, to Kassel, in the east, and to Mainz and Kaiserslautern in the west.

Since 1975, the 'Umlandverband Frankfurt', an intercommunal association of local governments with Frankfurt and Offenbach, 41 other urban communities and parts of six counties covering an area of 1,400 sq. km., is looking after the spatial development of the city region. The 49 members of the association have delegated quite an impressive list of functions to the association, in order to ensure a healthy spatial development process of the whole region. The Umlandverband Frankfurt has got responsibilities (among others) for land use planning, for public land policy, for transport planning, for environmental planning and protection, for tourism and leisure, and for regional economic promotion. Considering the tremendous development pressure and the usual political difficulties of intercommunal coordination, the association has been relatively successful in limiting the consumption of land for new development.

However, the agglomeration problems of the city region have grown considerably over recent years. Agglomeration diseconomies (housing shortage—particularly for lower- and medium- income households, traffic congestion, air pollution, waste disposal difficulties) are more and more threatening to the region's responsible policy makers and city managers. The removal of these problems add additional financial burdens in the land Hesse and on the city of Frankfurt, the German city with the highest liabilities (6,149 DM/head compares with an average of 3,082 DM/head of all larger German cities and only 1,413 DM of Munich).

International competition, changing life-styles of its citizens, an increasing number of one-person households and growing motorisation, are just a few factors which will continue to determine goals and objectives of urban growth management in Frankfurt and its surrounding urban region. The present socio-ecological coalition (social democrats and greens) does not have an easy task in coping with the present and the prospective problems they bear or will be confronted with. There is some evidence that the city region will further benefit from the polarising economic benefits of the forthcoming Single European Market in 1992. However, such economic benefits will have their social and environmental impacts. The conflict between economy and ecology will continue, intraurban and intraregional disparities will further grow.

In contrast: The Ruhrgebiet, the Non-Metropolis

Similar to the urban region of Frankfurt, the Ruhrgebiet, too, is a polycentric urban region. However, in contrast to the Rhein-Main-agglomeration, it does not have a leading core city like Frankfurt, rather a quartet of larger, still very much industrialized cities (Duisburg, Essen, Dortmund and Bochum) with a population of in between 400,000 and 800,000. None of them is of any major comparative international importance as Frankfurt. Within an urban region of more than five million inhabitants in 1990, these cities perform urban functions for only rather small urban hinterlands.

In the mid-1980s, the whole region, depending for too long a time on coal exploitation and steel production, was seriously affected by considerable regional economic and urban decline. The spatial, economic and social repercussions of structural change were enormous. Unemployment in the region rose to more than 15%, in some cities even up to almost 20%. Derelict, contaminated industrial land all over the region was blocked for new development. Several reasons were, among others, the large steel corporations' hesitancy to market the land, the high costs of decontamination, the bad image of the sites and the region as a whole, the lack of an innovative new economic base and by obsolete infrastructure.

A state government initiated a 300 million Dm land development fund ('Grundstucksfond Ruhrgebiet'), established to mobilize the unused land resources of the region, succeeded in gradually regenerating and reutilizing the derelict industrial land.

There is one other initiative which is worth describing in more detail:

In May 1988, the Government of Northrhine-Westphalia, with a view to the bulk of existing and anticipated regional problems in the Emscherzone, considering the inability of the respective communes to cope with these enormous problems, and drawing on experience of the Internationale Bauausstellung Berlin, decided to stage the *International Bauausstellung Emscher Park* (The Emscher Park International Building

Exhibition). The term, however, is misleading. The *International Bauaustellung Emscher-Park* is not intended to be an international exhibition like the forthcoming world exhibition in Sevilla or the many commercially motivated city exhibitions in Japan, nor an exhibition of stylish new or restored industrial buildings. It will, as the Prime Minister of Northrhine- Westphalia has officially stated, *'...provide business and professional organizations with an opportunity for long-term involvement in the comprehensive renewal of the Emscherzone...it is a step towards the advancement of the region.'* With the IBA- Emscher-Park the state government *'..has set itself the task of transforming industrial sites, regenerating green areas and preparing new bases for the economic development of this region.'*

The IBA-Emscher-Park, it is announced, is a *'workshop for the future of Old Industrial Areas'* which *'will set new standards in demonstrating how the challenge of renewing traditional industrial regions can be met by the comprehensive, long-term cooperation of government, business and professional organizations...'*. It aims, as the official *Memorandum on Content and Organization* conveys, *'to provide impulses of a conceptual, practical, political, financial and organizational nature for the future ecological, economic and social restructuring of the Emscher area'*.

The IBA-Emscher-Park is an ambitious vision and a challenging enterprise for a region which has been neglected by the same government for quite some time.

The expectations of the state government are considerable: *'In announcing the Emscher Park International Building Exhibition...the Government expressed the expectation that the period up to 1994 would see public and private investments within the building exhibition in an order of magnitude of three billion deutschmarks.'*

The IBA-Emscher is an ambitious ten year project. After having developed and compiled appropriate ideas for restructuring the region in 1989 and 1990, an international presentation of the concept will take place in April 1991. Subsequently, the projects will be implemented and presented in two further exhibitions scheduled for 1994 and 1995. After ten years of planning and implementation the project will be completed in 1999, just in time before the turn of the century.

The kind of projects the IBA-Emscher-Park Agency wishes to see implemented are described in the Memorandum as so-called *'Leitprojekte'* (Guideline projects). These *leitprojekte* are in fact policy ares on which the Agency will focus their efforts. These policy areas are:

The regeneration of derelict land and the creation of an Emscher Landscape Park, a huge public regional recreation area reaching from Duisburg to Dortmund.

The ecological improvement of the (river) Emscher system, an artificial and regulated man-made drainage system.

The reconversion of the Rhine-Herne Canal zone into a leisure area.

The conversion and re-use of derelict industrial monuments.

The creation of attractive industrial parks.

The promotion of new forms of owner occupied housing.

The advancement of new approaches to social and cultural development at the neighbourhood and local community level.

Nine exalted principals have been established for guiding the planning process in these policy areas. They document, in a way, an astonishing moralist position of the founder-fathers of the initiative.

Apart from developing a comprehensive strategy for the physical reconversion of the region, and for the promotion of the above mentioned *Leitprojekte*, planning workshops and architectural competitions will be initiated and carried out by the Agency. They primarily aim at improving the physical appearance of the region, the quality of architecture and that of local open space.

Undoubtedly, the IBA-Emscher-Park will have quite positive effects for the region. It will contribute to improving the image of this long neglected backyard of the Ruhrugbiet and it will contribute to a new regional identity and to more commitment of the zone's citizens to their polycentric region as a whole.

The projects initiated and promoted by the Agency will set new aesthetic, environmental and socio-cultural standards for future projects in the region and they will improve the physical appearance and the accessibility of the regional landscape, badly damaged by mining subsidence and urban agriculture and industrial dereliction.

Altogether, the *Internationale Bauausstellung Emscher-Park* will very much contribute to the cleaning-up and the greening of an ugly industrial landscape and to the economic use of scarce resources.

Managing Urban Growth in Germany: How German Cities Succeed in Limiting the Consumption of Virgin Land for Development.

A variety of factors have facilitated the management of urban growth in German city regions:

Above all, there is the effective four tier system of decision-making with a strong federal system at the upper level and powerful local governments and effectively managed local municipalities at the local level.

There are the well established procedures of mutual approval and harmonization of land use and other spatially relevant plans between the various tiers following the 'counter-current-principle'.

Comparably effective environmental policies and spatial plans at the regional level control and hinder urban sprawl and render the extensive use of virgin land for industrial development a difficult and timely exercise.

Rather efficient public urban transport systems, a generally higher density of residential quarters and more than two decades of successful inner city regeneration programmes (including quite successful traffic appeasement programmes), have transformed the German cities into lively and cost saving urban environments.

Recently a national urban policy of 'Stadtinnenent-wicklung' (inner city development) has been initiated to mobilize remaining urban land reserves within the built up fabric, to re-use derelict industrial land, to densify urban districts and to further improve urban management capabilities for such tasks.

The implementation of such projects in Frankfurt in the Ruhrgebiet and in other, more or less flourishing city regions of Germany will be facilitated by a high degree of environmental awareness, and by a comparably wide acceptance of public intervention into urban and regional development.

However, it is true that the chambers of commerce, the most influential economic lobby group are polemic at any occasion against tight public land use control, and the green's present massive opposition against any further use of greenfield sites for urban development. But their successes are comparably limited and there is a cultural rationale for it.

In contrast to other countries there is a different tradition of land utilization and consequently the perception of land as a scarce resource varies from that in North America. As a rule, the average German household has a different notion of distance and the preferred style of housing differs from that of an American one. It is at least far less land consuming. Consequently residential densities are usually higher, thus densities of 250 persons per hectare and more in residential quarters are accepted.

In the past, guided land use and related infrastructure policies of the city succeeded in avoiding urban sprawl and in containing the built up areas of the city region, even those under development pressure. Of course, suburbanisation pressures occur as in other countries, but again, even in rural areas of larger city regions, strict land use control renders it impossible for a private developer to neglect and to by-pass existing land use plans covering the whole territory of the Republic of Germany. Only in very exceptional cases, he (or the potential private investor) will succeed in getting a building permit outside built-up areas or outside areas already designated for new development. Industrial development, other than in areas already zoned for industrial

or mixed land uses, is virtually impossible. This is also true for larger public or private investments in zones outside built-up areas, for which a comprehensive spatial and environmental impact analysis ('Raumordnungsverfahren', or/and an 'Umweltvertraglichkeitsprufung') has to be carried out, involving a considerable number of public and semi-public agencies and authorities with spatial and environmental concerns in the time- consuming decision-making procedures.

The local and regional (print) media in Germany play a non-negotiable role in this context. Usually they monitor local development projects and decision-making processes and advocate for solutions with minimum interference into existing spatial structures.

There is one German regional planning instrument which deserves special attention: the regional physical plan, which, in Northrhine-Westphalia, is called 'Gebietsentwicklungsplan'.

For functional areas at the subregional level, the Gebietsentwicklungsplan, a physical regional plan is drawn by the planners of the Regierungsbezirk, a decentralized, purely administrative tier of the whole state government. Such plans, which cover the whole land and are in fact land use plans (usually at a scale of 1:50,000), formulate the goals of regional development, assign residential and industrial land uses, delineate all types of protected areas (e.g., for water resources, nature conservation or for recreation) and show the alignment of the existing and proposed transport and communication networks. The time horizon of these plans is about 15 years.

On one side, these plans are consolidated and generalized land use plans of local governments, which are very much involved in the design of these plans. On the other side these plans detail the spatial Leitbilder of the Landesentwicklungsplane mentioned earlier. The political conflict the plan usually evokes is the battle for more land being developed. Not an elected subregional parliament is discussing the objectives and contents of these plans and controlling the regional planner's work, but a so-called *Bezirksplanungsrat* (a district planning council) which is composed of representatives of the local governments. The general public is not involved in the planning and decision-making process but all relevant public and semi-public agencies (including established environmental groups) are asked to comment on drafts of the plan before its final approval.

After its formal approval by the Bezirksplanungsrat and the responsible Minister of the Land, the Gebietsentwicklungsplan is a reference plan for all local and land use plans. It guides all line ministries and public bodies in their spatial development actions at the subregional level.

Stadtinnenpolitik: A new Federal Urban Policy Line for Urban Containment

Based on the experience of more than two decades of successful urban renewal, drawing on experience with experimental housing for lower income households during the 1970s, and profiting from generally rather favourable attitudes towards urban containment in Germany, the Federal Ministry responsible for urban development launched a new experimental programme to promote land economizing local economic development planning.

The programme supports local development projects with an experimental character by taking over all additional development costs. Major action areas of the programme are the following:

The urban renewal of inner city industrial quarters by appropriate urban improvement measures, aiming at transforming such sites into attractive inner urban industrial parks. The improvement of the image of such sites is intended to be achieved by among other landscape measures, improving the road system, the parking infrastructure, and architectural improvement measures jointly financed by the city and the owners of the firms in the respective areas.

The re-use of derelict industrial land and buildings for new industrial uses. For various reasons (e.g., costs, complexity, time factor) the regeneration of derelict land did not proceed as expected. Particularly where the land market showed little interest in buying up unprofitable derelict industrial land, the public sector is forced to intervene in order to create more favourable conditions for new private investment.

The support of inner industrial trade and craft centres, of technological centres and breeder factories. From the provision of such facilities, the modernization of existing firms and the evolution of innovative local firms is expected.

The promotion of flatted industries and of development projects mixing production and services on the site. Here again, the aim is to increase the utilization of industrial inner urban sites and counteract the trendy land-consuming and traffic generating industrial park fashion at the urban fringe.

The whole federal programme which found the support of the state and local governments is continuously monitored and scientifically accompanied to public and private target groups.

Conclusion: Urban Growth Management in Germany, a Model for Canada?

It is up to the Canadian reader of this paper to decide, whether some of the ideas and concepts which have been described in this paper can be transferred to this country.

The experience in Germany shows that urban land can be used much more economically by applying a bundle of *incentives* to re-use already built-up land and by *disincentives* to develop greenfield sites.

Seen from an outside perspective, and compared with the achievements of urban and regional policy and planning in other European countries, the successes of such policies and their related planning instruments are remarkable.

Today, (West) Germany has the most balanced regional structure of all countries in western Europe. (This may change after the forthcoming re-unification of the two Germanys, but I assume, for an interim time only). Regional disparities are smaller than elsewhere. There is a relatively well balanced system of urban settlements and even in peripheral regions living conditions are acceptable. Such facts, of course, are very much rooted in history, and to a great extent they are a consequence of the federal system. However, some of the success can undoubtedly be contributed to 45 years of incessant information and communication efforts of regional and urban policies and of regional (spatial) planning across the country.

Also at the regional level, regional policy and regional planning has been quite successful over the past decades.

Compared with other countries, and despite a high population density, there is comparably little scattered development to be found in Germany. The close and continuous coordination of urban land use planning with regional spatial planning has considerably limited the extensive use of virgin land for settlement purposes.

Resulting from regional development plans and policies which were explicitly based on central place theories, there is a well functioning hierarchy of urban settlements providing the population of their respective hinterlands with all necessary public and private services in a reasonable distance.

Intra-regional disparities in urban agglomerations in Germany are much less conspicuous than in other densely populated regions of Europe. Even in declining regions there is little spatial concentration of poverty and crime and comparably little long-term urban dereliction.

Of course, one could say that all such achievements are rather linked to the economic strength and success of Germany as a whole, which, in turn, has multiple causes and for which a diversity of explanations do exist. The well established, strongly interwoven system of urban and regional policy and regional planning in Germany, with its impressive institutional and instrumental machinery, and its counter-current principle of political and administrative decision- making, can undoubtedly claim to have a non-negligible share in the many achievements reached in this country.

Figure 1: The Urban System in Western Europe



Figure 2: Location Data in the Region of the Umlandverband Frankfurt

Location Data in the Region of the Umlandverband Frankfurt

Overview

Towns and Communities	Surface area km²	Population 31.12.1998	Firms ①	Employees ①	Nearest motorway access Distance in km	Distance to airport km	German Railways: Packaged freight handling	German Railways: Express freight handling	German Railways: Loading track for rail waggon loads	Express train connection ②
1 Bad Homburg v. d. Höhe	51,15	51.091	1.853	20.266	- 2	25	●	●●	●●	●●
2 Bad Soden am Taunus	12,46	18.382	737	4.864	3- 5	20		●●	●●●	
3 Bad Vilbel	25,84	24.884	995	6.965	12	20			●●●	●●
4 Dietzenbach	21,67	27.127	792	5.275	6-12	20		●●	●●●	
5 Dreieich	83,34	39.082	1.525	14.763	3-10	10		●●●	●●●	
6 Egelsbach	14,81	8.039	311	2.880	1- 4	10		●●●	●●●	
7 Eppstein	34,20	12.215	288	1.328	1- 5	20		●●	●●●	
8 Zeilsheim	12,14	17.815	704	13.699	0,3- 2	15		●●	●●●	●●
9 Flörsheim am Main	22,96	16.231	584	3.789	1- 5	15			●●●	●●
10 Frankfurt am Main	248,87	662.411	32.596	605.795	0-10	0-15	●	●	●●●	●●
11 Friedrichsdorf	30,16	24.088	888	8.038	2- 5	30		●●	●●●	●●
12 Glashütten	27,11	5.370	188	472	15-20	30				
13 Grävenwiesbach	43,15	4.140	151	1.099	10-15	45			●	
14 Hainburg	15,94	13.772	573	3.501	3- 5	25		●		
15 Hattersheim am Main	15,81	23.332	803	3.922	0- 3	15		●●	●●	●
16 Hausenstamm	16,50	17.723	603	5.343	3- 5	20		●●	●●●	
17 Hochheim am Main	19,43	15.318	404	4.810	1- 5	25			●●●	
18 Hofheim am Taunus	57,37	33.885	1.219	8.317	2- 6	20		●	●●●	●●
19 Kelkheim (Taunus)	30,76	26.881	1.043	6.358	5	25				
20 Kelsterbach	15,33	13.370	386	3.791	2- 5	2			●●	●
21 Königstein im Taunus	25,07	16.373	634	4.463	10	25				
22 Kriftel	6,76	8.715	280	2.481	1- 3	15			●●●	●●
23 Kronberg im Taunus	18,82	17.932	731	8.489	8	20			●●●	●●
24 Langen	29,12	29.502	1.182	9.873	1- 4	10		●	●●●	
25 Liederbach	6,20	7.052	118	899	1- 2	20				
26 Mainhausen	17,87	6.809	315	2.709	3- 5	35			●●	
27 Maintal	32,40	36.599	1.019	9.091	2- 5	25			●●●	
28 Mühlheim am Main	20,74	34.023	1.187	7.713	6	25		●	●●●	
29 Neu-Anspach	36,14	10.117	309	1.816	10-15	35			●●●	
30 Neu-Isenburg	24,29	36.170	1.776	18.371	0- 5	10	●	●●	●●●	
31 Oberlahnstein	13,86	21.406	763	9.677	5	25	●	●●	●●●	
32 Oberursel (Taunus)	46,26	38.781	1.840	14.940	1- 3	15		●●	●●●	●
33 Offenbach am Main	45,34	107.078	4.406	88.599	0- 5	10	●	●●●	●●●	
34 Rodgau	86,04	37.319	1.339	9.353	0- 5	15		●●●	●●●	
35 Rödermark	30,91	23.517	793	5.363	1-10	20		●●	●●●	
36 Schmitten	35,80	7.927	436	2.121	20-30	30				
37 Schwalbach am Taunus	9,48	14.974	382	4.682	5	15				●●
38 Seligenstadt	30,87	17.023	679	6.677	3- 5	35		●	●	
39 Steinbach (Taunus)	4,40	8.511	219	1.001	5- 8	15				●●
40 Sulzbach (Taunus)	7,85	8.522	308	4.048	0,5	20				●
41 Usingen im Taunus	85,98	11.348	414	2.842	15-20	40		●	●	
42 Waldheim	38,38	7.814	262	1.089	10	35			●	
43 Weilrod	71,19	5.909	257	1.035	15-30	35				

① UVF count of companies in 1977/78

② Express-train lines on regular service using ET 420 locomotives

Figure 3: Rhine-Main Agglomeration





Figure 4: Public Transport Network in Rhine-Main Region



Figure 5: Rhine-Ruhr Agglomeration



Figure 6: Rhine-Main, Rhine-Ruhr and Toronto Compared



8

SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION IN THE AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 1, 1990

Don Stevenson

The afternoon consisted of two plenary sessions, the first on transportation and density issues, and the second on strategies and tools. The discussions were animated by two Toronto- area experts at each session. The international speakers were divided between the two panels.

Transportation and Density

The first session *Transportation and Density* was animated by Ron Soskolne, Senior Vice President for Planning and Development of Olympia & York, and Juri Pill, General Manager of Administration and Planning of the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC). The international speakers on this panel were Gilles Antier, Director of International Affairs for the Institute of Town Planning and Development in the Ile-de-France region; Gerard Keijzers, Deputy Head of Strategic Planning in the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment of the Netherlands; and Brian McLoughlin, Chair of Town Planning at the University of Melbourne.

Ron Soskolne opened the session with the observation that the morning had produced an apparent consensus that metropolitan growth management should emphasize public transportation and patterns of development that facilitate higher densities and therefore public transit. He said that the main barrier to achieving these objectives appeared to be that politicians are responding to a public that seems to prefer cars and low density development. In addition, it is difficult to make decisions given that responsibilities are spread among a number of municipalities and layers of government.

With this background, Soskolne asked each of the panellists to address two questions:

- How was consensus achieved in your metropolitan area (if it was) to link suburbs with transit?
- What are the weaknesses of the decision-making process in your metropolitan area?

Gilles Antier responded by saying that the major accomplishment of the 1960s in the Paris region was the development of the RER express transit system that linked the suburbs to the central city. Even though there is a well organized transit system in Paris, there is still a great deal of congestion in the central city. The new priorities for transportation in the 1990s are to develop suburb-to-suburb transit links and to do a better job of linking the subway system, the RER, bus and other rail connections and especially the TGV.

Antier said that France is still trying to break down its traditional, centralized, and authoritarian decision-making structure, a process begun with a set of decentralization laws in 1982. He believes that a more decentralized and less authoritarian system will be more efficient in the long run (he noted the inefficiency of the authoritarian system in Moscow). The challenge for regional transportation planning in the Paris area is to provide plenty of opportunity for input from municipalities, the private sector and various interest groups and then to make the necessary decisions. It will be necessary to get the private sector to accept and follow regional planning guidelines since many of the specific developments will be undertaken by it. He added that each local municipality has a working relationship with private sector partners.

Antier concluded by saying that in 1965, at the time of the first regional plan, the Ile-de- France region had to be strong and authoritarian to stop urban sprawl. In 1990 the atmosphere is different and the general public is much more aware of the implications of development.

Gerard Keijzers said that at present in the Randstad there is a good relationship between the national and local governments especially in the development of transportation infrastructure. He said that three planning reports have been prepared as national guides to action in the areas of land use, transportation and the environment. They were all developed on the basis of extensive consultation with both the private and public sectors. Local governments and the private sector have been convinced of the need for such plans and guidelines as necessity for the competitiveness of the Dutch economy. Keijzers said that intergovernmental and public-private cooperation was strong in the 1950s and 1960s, weak in the 1970s and early 1980s, but is now strong again.

Brian McLoughlin said that, in general, transportation and land use planning was in an appalling state of weakness in the Melbourne region. On the positive side, he noted Melbourne's heritage of a first-class tramway and suburban rail system, although now somewhat decaying. On the negative side, he said that the Melbourne region had been characterized in the 1950s and 1960s by suburban sprawl based on the private car. He said that the state of Victoria had a long history of bureaucratic infighting between the Ministry of Roads and the Ministry of Railways. Because the road lobby in favour of cars was stronger than the public transit lobby, local decisions have tended to favour road building. In his area, for example, a proposal has been made to close down an

existing commuter rail line to make room for an expressway. He added that the transportation and road engineers (the facility builders) were more influential than the land use planners (the system developers) and that little research had been conducted on who wins and loses from different transportation projects.

Juri Pill commented that subsidies for transportation may go to different groups or areas depending on the objectives of government. He noted that in the Netherlands and in the Paris region there were low transit fares and large government subsidies for transit. He asked the panellists if, in their region, transit was viewed primarily as a social service for people without cars or whether policy was deliberately aimed at encouraging people to move from cars to transit?

Gerard Keijzers said that in the Netherlands, until a few years ago, transit was seen as a social service with the objective of guaranteeing access to local transportation to all. In recent years, environmental objectives have become the determining factor in the planning of infrastructure and in measures to reduce the dependency on cars and the congestion on Dutch roads. A deliberate national choice has now been made to free highways for the transportation of goods, leaving public transit for commuting. Measures to encourage the switch from cars to transit have been based on a combination of social, economic and environmental factors.

Gilles Antier said that one of the main reasons for investing in transit as opposed to roads in the Paris region is financial. The linking of suburbs can be accomplished much more cheaply by transit rather than freeways. The aim is to use a wide variety of public transportation modes, using many kinds of new technology depending on the density of the communities to be served. He said that there is now a consensus in the Paris region that transit is the way of the future. The objective of regional planning is to strengthen existing nodes and improve the effectiveness of the transit system. As an example, he said that he would now take overseas business visitors from a downtown hotel to la Defense by subway rather than by car (as he would have in previous years)—a trip of 10 minutes by transit as opposed to 40 minutes by car.

Brian McLoughlin said that in Melbourne public transit has tended to be looked at somewhat like public housing, as part of the social services network, and that, therefore, there has been a certain social stigma attached to using public transit. He said that ownership of a car and separate house has been part of the Australian 'macho' image. He said that there has never been a serious long-term debate in the Melbourne region about the long-term implications of transit and density decisions. Local debates tend to be characterized by new middle class suburbs fighting against new development or old working class areas fighting to maintain transit lines.

At this point in the proceedings, Juri Pill took a poll of the audience as to how people had come to the conference centre. A large majority responded that they had come by public transit.

Juri Pill asked the panellist if there were any private investments in public transit in their regions.

Gerard Keijzers said that all transit expenditures were from public funds in the Netherlands—and there was never enough.

Gilles Antier said that in the Paris region, funding for transit comes from all three levels of government—the national government, the Ile-de-France region, and the local municipalities. The RER express transit system is 60% funded by the national government. Local municipalities pay a higher share of suburb-to-suburb public transportation links. There are five transit zones in the region. The outer zones (20-40 kms. from Paris) are served in large part by private bus companies which are members of the regional transit network. Riders can use 'orange cards' (transit passes) interchangeably on all routes in the network whether operated by public or private authorities.

Brian McLoughlin said that in the Melbourne area there was also an effective system of zones served by different forms of transit. He said that 60% of the tram cars in the system are owned by the private sector (often Japanese companies) and leased back to the public transportation authority. He said that there was now a proposal from a private consortium for a TGV between Melbourne and Sydney which, however, he doubts will ever be implemented.

Ron Soskolne referred to the new $2 billion subway line linking the Canary Wharf development to the city of London—20% of which is being paid for by Olympia & York. He added that there were many examples in Japan and elsewhere of private sector involvement in public transit.

Juri Pill commented on the irony of the fact that some new transit proposals that would improve the environment were being held up by environmental assessment processes.

A questioner asked the panellists if there were successful examples in their regions of flexible working hours reducing peak loads on transit systems.

Gerard Keijzers responded that even though office hours are flexible in the Netherlands, rush hours persist. He added that new flexible working weeks have virtually eliminated rush hours on Fridays.

Gilles Antiers said that there was no system of flexible hours in Paris and that there was still a heavy rush hour. He said that a current challenge was to improve the technology of the transit system. Recent technical improvements to the express system (the RER) had reduced the delay between trains from 2 1/2 minutes to 1 minute, 35 seconds.

A questioner asked how large nodal centres needed to be to justify rapid transit links.

Brian McLoughlin said that the question involved an assessment of the political culture of the metropolitan area. Questions of desirable density involve more than considerations of transit. He said that huge investments in public transit require intense development around nodes. He cautioned that the encouragement of higher residential densities may not free up much land and that transit economics alone is an insufficient justification for increasing densities and arresting suburban sprawl.

Ron Soskolne said that there appears to be an increased willingness in the Greater Toronto Area suburbs to live and work at higher densities. The challenge is to get the transit systems and the higher densities linked.

An audience member said that there did not appear to be a sufficient sense of crisis motivating decision-makers. She said that students were pushing for radical moves to protect the environment. In her opinion, public opinion in Toronto and in many other parts of the world, is ready to accept a massive shift from reliance on cars to public transit.

Gerard Keijzers indicated his agreement that there is an environmental crisis. The 1989 national report on the environment in the Netherlands recommended major reductions in car usage. There was a unanimous vote in the Dutch parliament to reduce the use of cars. Programs are underway to reduce parking capacities in the cities, to introduce toll roads, to build new transit lines and to require technical pro-environment improvements to cars.

Gilles Antier said that planners as advisors can only put up the arguments politicians can use in making decisions, which may require trade-offs. He said that environmental issues have moved well up on the scale of political priorities.

Brian McLoughlin said that he hesitated to call the present situation an environmental crisis, although there is a world wide environmental problem. He said that when the world oil price quadrupled in 1973-4, a sense of crisis gave rise to many conservation actions.

A questioner noted that in Canada the federal government was not spending much on transportation and that the province of Ontario was not relying on user fees. He asked the panellists what percentage of the cost of transit was paid by fares in their regions.

Brian McLoughlin said that fares in Melbourne only cover 35 - 40% of the cost (a day pass is $2.60), a percentage he thought was too low.

Gilles Antier said that fares cover 35% of the cost of transit in Paris, although the percentage may rise in the future. He said that 'orange cards' cost $44 per month, half of which is covered by the employers.

Gerard Keijzers noted that in the Netherlands fares covered a higher percentage of the cost of bus transportation than rail.

Juri Pill said that TTC studies have shown that changes in service levels affect transit ridership more than price. He said that the TTC approach of a high revenue/cost ratio with extra money being spent on service improvement is the envy of other transit systems.

Brian McLoughlin agreed that service levels are more important than transit fares.

Gerard Keijzers said that there were strong protests in the Netherlands against the possibility of any fare increases.

A questioner asked the panellists for their opinion on charging for distance rather than using flat fares as a planning tool.

Gilles Antier said that because the Paris region is so large, there are institutional problems in setting fares. Many carriers are involved, even though they all belong to the same association. He said that the Ile-de-France Region would like to take over total control of the regional transit system but there are still elements which are under direct national control.

Brian McLoughlin said that any flat rate system tends to be socially progressive. In Australia, since most healthy people have moved from the outer suburbs to the inner city, flat fares would make the system even more progressive.

An audience member noted that in some metropolitan areas, such as those in the Netherlands, richer people are moving to the inner city, thus pushing up housing prices. He asked if there were any programs to make affordable housing more available in Dutch cities.

Gerard Keijzers replied that the Netherlands was planning for an increase of 10% in the numbers of dwelling units in the major Dutch cities.

Strategies and Tools

The second panel on *Strategies and Tools* was animated by Neal Irwin, Managing Director of the IBI Group of Consultants and Joe Berridge, Senior Partner of Berridge Lewinberg

and Greenberg, consultants. The international speakers on this panel were Elizabeth Hollander, former Planning Commissioner of Chicago; Ray Brady, Research Director of the Association of Bay Area Governments; Klaus Kunzmann, Director of the Planning School at the University of Dortmund; and Peter Hall, Director of the Institute of Urban and Regional Development at the University of California at Berkeley.

Neal Irwin began the session by presenting a slide summarizing the potential strategies and tools from the IBI study on urban structure concepts for the Greater Toronto Area. Among the questions he posed to the panellists from this presentation were the following:

1) Is it worth changing course?

2) If so, towards which option?

- o spread (sprawl) development?
- o further concentration in the centre, requiring more government intervention but being most compatible with environmental preservation?
- o nodal development outside the central city?

3) How do we achieve the preferred option?

- o should we add to the tools we now have at our disposal—e.g., differential developer levies to encourage denser development
- o new infrastructure taxes such as requiring all employees who would benefit from a new transit line to help pay for it
- o direct pricing for infrastructure use such as fees for the use of certain roads depending on the time of day or type of vehicle
- o density purchase—allowing land owners to buy more density to help finance infrastructure development such as a transit line
- o new methods of monitoring transit development and its impact

4) How do we coordinate the planning and delivery of the new infrastructure? How do we finance it? (Irwin said he was intrigued by the German system of counter controls whereby lower levels of government with responsibilities for implementation have approval powers over the broader plans or legislation of senior levels of government)

5) How do we assess the consequences and risks of change?

Klaus Kunzmann said that it was worth changing course. He stressed the importance of developing allies and coalitions. He said that it was essential to get people and institutions together by coopting chambers of commerce, the universities and various levels of government. He said the media must be constantly showing the benefits of planned development. Soap operas, for example, should show people travelling by public transit.

From a European perspective, he favoured the nodal option, with the nodes developed around existing communities rather than from scratch. He said that satellite cities built up around green fields such as some of those in the Paris region has experienced many social problems associated, in part, with concentrations of low income people.

Kunzmann said that a set of tools must comprise a combination of incentives and disincentives.

Elizabeth Hollander said that it is worth changing course. She said that she was impressed by the number of elected officials in the audience and their evident interest in the future of the region. She said that Toronto had an international reputation as a leader anticipating its problems, although she hears now that its problems are increasing.

She said the nodal option makes sense because it gives a sense of choice. She cautioned against permitting the distance between homes and jobs to grow. She said that the tax structure was an important determinant of development patterns and that the property tax can act as a disincentive to rational development. She noted that Illinois has now set aside a portion of its income tax for local education.

She stressed the importance of a senior government with the power and the will to act, not arbitrarily, but in the interest of the whole region. She also said it was important for the region to have far-sighted leaders, in politics and other sectors.

Raymond Brady said that a decision made to change direction must be made consciously by the people. In making such a decision there must be an awareness of three questions:

- What is the impact on the economy?
- Who pays and who benefits?
- Is the solution politically acceptable?

He said that, in deciding on various tools, it was particularly important to assess the likely impacts in advance. He cited a recent proposal by a monetary economist for road user- fees in the Bay Area which would have had an opposite result to the

objectives being sought. He said that no government has ever dealt very successfully with allocations for land use and their implications for the supply, demand and price of housing.

Peter Hall said that changing course towards greater centralization can be very difficult since people have pushed for decentralization for one hundred years. He suggested that one should observe what people do and not just what they say or think. Even in Germany with its well functioning inner cities and transit systems, people use cars outside of the city.

He suggested that the question is whether it is possible to make North Americans act more like Europeans. One way to do so would be to make it easier for people to opt for a more European approach. The development of a good transit system with higher densities around stations can be made more attractive. People who prefer to live in a 'sprawl' environment would then find fewer resources devoted to highways, although their freedom to choose would not be restricted.

With respect to specific new tools, he suggested that a careful evaluation of impacts was essential. The establishment of toll roads, for example, could have unanticipated results. If the private sector is asked to help pay the capital costs of infrastructure, it is important that the tail not wag the dog and that the development still takes place where it should. He said that there have been good and bad examples of satellite cities. There have been some social problems in the cities around Paris while some British satellite cities, often built around existing nodes, like Peterborough, have been successes.

A questioner asked about the effectiveness of zoning controls.

Elizabeth Hollander replied that official plans and development controls were useful tools and have to be treated seriously. She said that the key is to ensure that the implementers have input into the development of the plans.

Neal Irwin asked Klaus Kunzmann if there were things in the West German tool kit that could be useful in Canada.

Kunzmann said that it could be very useful if senior officers from Greater Toronto Area municipalities were to spend some time in Europe to see if European tools were appropriate for the situation here.

Peter Hall said that circumstances alter cases. There is a case for development controls—even very tough development controls—as in the United Kingdom or West Germany. Much depends on the relationship between the upper and lower tiers of local government. The system in the UK between counties and lower tier municipalities resembles that in Canada between the regional governments and their municipalities although the Thatcher government had been dismantled much of the system. He said

that there is a strong case for the development of broad plans at the regional level to be implemented by the lower tier.

A questioner asked whether there were good examples of combined economic, social and ecological planning.

Neal Irwin said that in Metro Toronto there were land use plans, economic plans, and a social strategy with the challenge being to combine them.

Elizabeth Hollander said that the business sector had done some good economic planning in the Chicago area. She said that although there had been some useful social planning after the race riots of 1968, it was not being done properly now and Third World economies were developing in some American inner cities.

Ray Brady agreed that it was necessary to attempt to combine economic and social planning.

Joe Berridge suggested that with responsibilities for action resting with different levels of government, there was a big intergovernmental coordination problem.

Peter Hall suggested that social, economic and land use plans should be developed simultaneously. He said that such planning should be done first in communities and then in larger units. In the UK, the large metropolitan areas started to challenge the national government, a built-in recipe for conflict.

Klaus Kunzmann said that it was unrealistic to expect that there would ever be coordinated plans within and between levels of government, especially when plans are developed separately. He said that the smaller the area, the easier it is to achieve a coordinated plan. He suggested that it was therefore easier and more useful to decentralize responsibilities.

A questioner asked if the panellists believed that action should be taken to preserve green space around urban areas, and if so, should land owners be compensated for their loss of development rights.

Peter Hall said that there were three ways for governments to preserve green space:

1) By buying the land. He said the green belt in the Bay Area is now being extended through purchase.

2) By agreements with owners to preserve the land. This is a widely used tool in the UK involving, for example, management agreements with farmers.

3) By bringing in tough development controls. This was the approach in the UK after the Second World War. It has given rise to continued tensions, which have become worse in the London green belt, as the economics of agriculture has become more difficult.

A questioner asked the panellists about the extent to which planning and environmental assessment legislation was combined.

Klaus Kunzmann said that this was being attempted at the local level in Germany. He said it was important for the staff of environment and planning ministries to work together. He added that the more factors that are brought into the process, the tougher it is to get agreement.

Ray Brady said that environmental assessment was used only for specific projects in the United States, and was therefore not linked to planning legislation.

Peter Hall suggested that some useful ideas could be obtained from reading the recently released UK White Paper on the environment.

Neal Irwin commented that many of the 'environmental' blockages to the approval process have essentially been NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) issues. He suggested that the two processes should be combined.

An audience member raised some questions about the geographic space to be covered in planning and managing metropolitan area development. Should planning for the Greater Toronto Area extend beyond the GTA itself? Should the provincial government be planning the development of the rest of the province? Should there not be a federal study on the geographic implications of its immigration policy?

Peter Hall said that a national urban policy, especially in Canada, is not a realistic objective. He said France had tried it with mixed results. He doubted that the federal government could divert immigration out of the Greater Toronto Area, given that immigrants tend to migrate to large cities to join their compatriots. He suggested that it was realistic for the province of Ontario, if it so desired, to undertake a policy of geographic decentralization.

Klaus Kunzmann said that each state and city in Germany has a quota of immigrants. For the first five years immigrants must stay in the areas where they have been assigned. Expenditures for housing, social programs and initial allowances for immigrants are responsibilities of the cities.

Ray Brady said that in his opinion, the appropriate planning area should be based on the appropriate economic as well as political space. He said that in the Bay Area it should include eleven counties rather than the current nine, in other words all the areas where growth centred in the region would be expected to take place.

Elizabeth Hollander countered that planning has to be good politics to work. Rational planning units that are not accepted politically normally don't work.

Richard Gilbert said that his reading of the IBI report has convinced him that the concentration model makes more sense than the nodal model. He asked the panel members for political advice on getting people to change perceptions.

Ray Brady suggested that the planning exercise should have a social psychologist on staff. He cautioned that any solution involving concentration must ensure that the peripheral regions see themselves as equal partners.

Elizabeth Hollander said that Daniel Burnham had written a great report on the Chicago waterfront that a six year old could understand. Those school children who read the report are now in positions of authority and the report is now finally being implemented.

Peter Hall said that it is very difficult to persuade people to do what they don't want to do and a fundamental re-education is required. He suggested that the current generation of children may be our leaders in changing direction.

Klaus Kunzmann said that change in Germany is being led by young people who do not want to live in the suburbs and are moving back into the city.

Neal Irwin said that we may not have given people a real choice because often the only available or affordable housing has been in the suburbs.

Conclusion

An opportunity for concluding statements was given to Gardner Church, Deputy Minister of the Office of the Greater Toronto Area, which provided financial and other support to the Symposium, and Richard Gilbert, President of the Canadian Urban Institute, which organized the Symposium. Gardner Church said that he was encouraged that it did appear possible to achieve consensus on broad issues. He said he sensed a consensus on the need for longer-term planning and better integrating structures. He said that he was thrilled with the conclusion that there were alternatives to managing regional growth other than creating new governmental structures. He said he was also delighted with the rebirth in the Canadian Urban Institute of a strong centre of urban intelligence.

Richard Gilbert said he thought the Symposium had achieved its two objectives: to hear international experts on their experiences and to provide an opportunity for local decision-makers in the Greater Toronto Area to get together and discuss their common future.

CONTRIBUTORS

Peter Hall
He is Director of the Institute of Urban and Regional Development and Professor of City and Regional Planning at the University of California at Berkeley. Peter Hall is the author of more than 20 books on urban issues—most recently *Cities of Tomorrow* and *London 2001*.

Elizabeth Hollander
A former Commissioner of Planning for the City of Chicago, and head of a major citizen's advocacy group, Elizabeth Hollander is now Executive Director of the Illinois Commission on the Future of Public Service.

Raymond Brady
He is Director of Research for the Association of (San Francisco) Bay Area Governments. For the last ten years Raymond Brady has been working to improve the analysis used in developing public policies in the Bay Area dealing with urban development.

Gilles Antier
Director for International Activities of the Greater Paris Region Planning Agency, Gilles Antier has had extensive experience in dealing with the major planning issues Paris has faced since 1978.

Gerard Keijzers
Dr. Keijzers is the Deputy Head of Strategic Planning in the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment for the Government of the Netherlands. He was formerly head of the Netherlands National Environment Plan.

Brian McLoughlin
He has been Chair of Town Planning for Melbourne since 1983, following a distinguished academic and business career in urban planning and development.

Klaus Kunzman
He is Professor and Director of the Dortmund School of Planning's interdisciplinary research centre. He has managed a number of research projects for German universities on urban policy issues—including several dealing with the impact of the European Common Market on German cities.

Comparative Information on Seven Urban Regions

	TORONTO	CHICAGO	FRANKFURT	MELBOURNE	PARIS	SAN FRANCISCO	STOCKHOLM
POPULATION (year)	(1986)	(1980)	(1986)	(1986)	(1985)	(1986)	(1986)
-Regional	3,700,000	7,103,618		3,832,443	10,071,068		1,606,157
-Metropolitan	2,190,863	6,216,200	3,319,000	2,931,800		5,731,400	1,471,242
(% of Country)	8.8%	2.8%	5.41%	19.0%	18.5%	2.4%	17.7%
-Core City	607,384	3,015,072	618,268	200,000 ('central region')	2,176,243	749,000	669,485
Density (per sq.km)							
-Core City	6,217	5,084	2,475		20,647	6232.4	3,051
-Metro Area	3,461	1,263		643.2	838		293
SURFACE AREA (sq. km.)							
-Regional	6,890	9,632			12,012	4,584,261 (acres)	
-Metropolitan	632	4,923.6	6,821	6126.50		18,018	6,487.5
(% of Country)	.006%	.05%	2.74	.05%	2.2%	0.2%	1.4%
-Core City	97.7	593	248.6	84.66 ('central region')	105.4	31,168 (acres)	187.5
URBAN REGION: NAME AND COMPOSITION	"Greater Toronto Area": includes Regional Municipalities of Halton, Metro Toronto, Peel, York, Durham	unofficially called "North-eastern Illinois Area" and includes counties of: Cook, Dupage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, Will, and City of Chicago	Umelandverband Frankfurt	'Melbourne Statistical Division' (MSD) includes municipalities of: Phillip Island, French Island, Geelong, Queenscliff, Whittlesea, Gisborne, Tullamarine	"Ile-de-France" includes: City of Paris, Counties of Hauts-de-Seine, Essonne, Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne, Seine-et-Marne, Yvelines, Val-d'Oise		"Stockholm County"
METROPOLITAN AREA: NAME AND COMPOSITION	"Metropolitan Toronto": includes Cities of Toronto, York, Etobicoke, Scarborough, North York and Borough of East York	"Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area": includes Counties of Cook, Dupage, McHenry	'Region Rhein-Main' includes cities of Offenbach, Hanau, Wiesbaden, Darmstadt (no metropolitan government or authority; state government is responsible)	58 municipalities		"San Francisco Bay Area" includes: Counties of Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, Sonoma and consolidated city/county San Francisco	"Greater Stockholm" includes: City of Stockholm plus the municipalities of Lidingo, Vaxholm, Taby, Haninge, Botkyrka, Ekero, Upplands-Bro, Solna, Upplands-Vasby, Vallentuna, Danderyd, Osteraker, Nacka, Tyreso, Salem, Huddinge, Jarfalla, Sigtuna, Sollentuna, Sundbyberg, Vaxholm
CORE CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCE (US $)	(1986)	(1985)	(1986)	(1986)	(1986)	(1986)	(1986)
-Revenues	336,347,360	2,112,178,983	4,727,417,380 (city, DM)	700,000,000 (core city)	2,274,279,600	1,745,900,000	2,808,661,400
-Expenditures	336,347,360	2,112,178,983	4,727,417,380 (city, DM)	700,000,000 (core city)	2,964,493,600	1,362,900,000	2,930,577,400

	TORONTO	CHICAGO	FRANKFURT	MELBOURNE	PARIS	SAN FRANCISCO	STOCKHOLM
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE – Upper Tier	GTA it is not a government jurisdiction but two Provincial Agencies, Office of the Greater Toronto Area (OGTA) and the Greater Toronto Coordinating Committee (GTTC), coordinate regional planning. There are 4 regional governments and 1 metropolitan government in the area.	Chicago Area Transit Study; Regional Transit Authority; Northeastern Illinois Planning Council; 6 County Governments; no metro government	Upper tier: State (Land) of Hesse (Hessen) Lower Tier: Regierungsbezirk Darmstadt	State of Victoria (no metropolitan government)	Regional Council Paris City Council	Association of Bay Area Governments; no governing body for Bay Area or Region; 9 county governments	no metro government; Stockholm County Council
– Lower Tier		Chicago City Council plus 260 other municipalities	Umlandverband Frankfurt: intercommunal association and authority with limited functions such as land use planning, geographical information system, selected environmental tasks, waste disposal.		7 County Councils		Stockholm City Council plus 21 other municipal governments
Responsibilities	Upper-tier Councils: regional planning, roads, transit, sewer system, refuse disposal, social services and welfare, police	County Government: some regional planning, health and social services, providing lower tier functions for unincorporated areas	City of Frankfurt: (powerful) independent local government with all urban development functions, including local economic promotion and development, and strong local cultural development.	State Government: strategic planning, housing, education, major roads, economic planning, health, recreation	Regional Council: transportation, open space, regional planning, building and maintenance of high schools, professional training, technological research	97 municipal gov'ts and San Francisco (consolidated city/county)	County Council: transit, health care, regional planning, some local services
	Lower-tier Councils: refuse collection, zoning, public housing, building inspection, neighbourhood planning	City Council: job development, hard services, long range economic strategy planning, neighbourhood planning	Verkehrverbund Rhein-Main: Regional Transport Authority	Area Municipalities: streets, refuse collection, building and town planning controls	Paris City Council: public safety, public works, refuse collection, sewer system, city planning		Local Council: schools, social services (e.g., treatment of alcoholics, child welfare), city planning, sewage, water supply
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	CITY METRO (1980)	city metro (1980)	city (1987) metro (1987)	metro (1986) 'inner region'	city metro (1980)	city region (1990)	city metro (1980)
• total employment	340,980 1,186,465	1,236,866 3,616,600	688,962 1,280,000	1.0 0.5	1,813,000 4,704,744	671,800 5,861,119	383,300
• % of total employment:				25.0 15.0	.02		
a) agriculture	.3 .3			15.0 10.0			.2
b) industry	19.2 23.3		23.4% 42.0% industry	15.5 31.0	19.8 24.0		
c) construction	12.4 13.2	60.5 18.4	76.4% 57.4% services	5.5 5.5	5.8	15.3	13.1
d) services	62.8 68.0	2.7 10.4		18.0 17.0	80.2 68.8		4.5
e) public administration	5.3 5.3	32.5 34.5		20.0 20.0		20.4	40.9
f) retail and wholesale		5.2 11.8				14.0	41.3
g) unclassified		24.7				24.4	
						16.9	

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